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THE CHARATERIZATION OF PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Irit Mevorach+ & Adrian Walters*  
 
The decade since the financial crisis has witnessed a proliferation of various ‘light touch’ 
financial restructuring techniques in the form of so-called pre-insolvency proceedings. 
These proceedings inhabit a space on the spectrum of insolvency and restructuring law, 
somewhere between a pure contractual workout, the domain of contract law, and a formal 
insolvency or rehabilitation proceeding, the domain of insolvency law. While, to date, 
international insolvency instruments have tended to define insolvency proceedings quite 
expansively, discussion of the cross-border implications of pre-insolvency proceedings has 
barely begun. The question is whether pre-insolvency proceedings should qualify as 
proceedings related to insolvency for the purpose of private international law 
characterization. The risk is over-inclusivity of cross-border insolvency law, which, where 
it is based on universality and unity, might defeat contractual expectations. This article 
argues, however, that we should be slow to exclude pre-insolvency proceedings from cross-
border insolvency law: these proceedings are initiated in the zone of insolvency, their 
effectiveness depends on a statutory mandate and not purely on private ordering, they 
interact and intersect with formal proceedings, and can benefit from the unique system 
developed by cross-border insolvency law. We suggest, though, that modified universalism 
(the leading norm of cross-border insolvency) and international insolvency instruments, 
should, and are able to, adjust to the peculiarities of pre-insolvency proceedings to address 
concerns about inclusivity and accommodate pre-insolvency proceedings adequately. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Insolvency is typically excluded from international instruments harmonizing the private 
international law of commercial and civil law matters.1 It is a ‘unique’ sub-system of 
commercial law, linked to issues of public interest and aiming to promote a fair process 
taking account of interests of multiple groups of stakeholders, to maximize value, minimize 
waste, and, enable rescue of viable businesses. Thus, international insolvency law (or 
‘cross-border insolvency’) is developing as a sui generis system of private international 																																																								
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1 Insolvency is, for example, excluded from the draft Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments (see art 2; <https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments/special-commission>); 
Bankruptcy judgments are excluded from the EU regime for enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(in the EU, jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, excluding 
bankruptcy, is subject to the Brussels I Regulation; Regulation (EU) No 1215/ 2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2012 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters). Bankruptcy matters were also excluded from the Hague Convention of 1 February 1971 on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and from the Convention of 30 
June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. 
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law for transnational insolvency, which aims to achieve the goals of insolvency in cross-
border cases.2 Predominantly based on the norm of modified universalism,3 this emerging 
cross-border insolvency system prescribes efficient levels of centralization of proceedings, 
recognized and assisted by foreign authorities, to maximize value and enable business 
rescue, considering all relevant stakeholders wherever located. This special system seeks 
to transcend domestic private international law rules to provide a harmonized framework 
for international insolvencies. 
The decade since the financial crisis has witnessed, however, a significant shift 
from bank to capital market financing of large corporate borrowers that has led to profound 
changes in the market for resolution of corporate financial distress 4  – notably the 
emergence of ‘light touch’ formal financial (balance sheet) restructuring techniques.5 
Policymakers, especially in the European Union, have responded to market developments 
by embarking on an aggressive new phase of corporate rescue oriented legislative 
endeavour that focuses on so-called pre-insolvency or preventive insolvency proceedings.6  
This current vogue for pre-insolvency proceedings is the latest phase of a global 
effort to fashion a comprehensive range of debt resolution tools for use at various stages of 
what accountants sometimes refer to as the demise curve7 of the corporate life cycle. In 
many systems, until relatively recently, the only viable choice for debtors and creditors 
were at the extremes: either a private, informal, out-of-court workout – in other words a 
contract between the debtor and creditors, and the creditors inter se, requiring unanimity 
among creditors for it to become binding − or a formal liquidation in which creditors, aided 																																																								
2 See also IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 15, who proposed that cross-border 
insolvency should be based on ‘internationalist’ principles and construct ‘rules of private international law that are in 
harmony with the realities of such cross-border activity.’ Cf Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236, 
[102]-[105] (Lord Collins) declining to accept a sui generis characterization of transaction avoidance proceedings. 
3 See generally, JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276; I Mevorach, The 
Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (OUP 2018) ch 1. 
4 See S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 36 OJLS 697, 701. 
5  See eg the English Scheme of Arrangement in Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006, the Spanish Homologated 
Refinancing Agreement introduced in 2015, or the Romanian Preventive Concordat proceedings, included in a reformed 
insolvency law (Law 85/2014 on insolvency prevention procedures and insolvency). See also generally The Rise of 
Preventive Restructuring Schemes: Challenges and Opportunities (Papers from the INSOL Europe Academic Forum 
Annual Conference, Warsaw, Poland, 4-5 October 2017); L Stanghellini et al, Best Practices in European Restructuring 
(Wolters Kluwer 2018), and the discussion of the US Chapter 11 and its influence globally, in Section 2 below. 
6 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures 
concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 [2019] OJ L172/18. 
For legislative history see EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, 
insolvency and discharge procedures COM (2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD) (‘Commission Proposal’). The EU Council 
adopted its initial position on the proposed Directive on October 11, 2018 and produced a compromise text: see EU 
Council 12536/18 (‘Council Position’). See also European Parliament legislative resolution of 28 March 2019 on the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second 
chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending 
Directive 2012/30/EU (P8_TA-PROV (2019) 0321). For commentary on the text of the Directive in the form originally 
proposed by the EU Commission see G McCormack, ‘Corporate Restructuring Law – A Second Chance for Europe?’ 
(2017) 42 EL Rev 532; NWA Tollenaar, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Preventive Restructuring 
Proceedings’ (2017) 30 Insolv Int 65. It should be noted, though, that this initiative, although contemplating tools that 
may in practice be used by large entities was primarily aimed at addressing the problem of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in distress. See eg Commission Proposal at 19 (aims stated to include reduction in barriers to cross-border 
credit to SMEs and increased access for SMEs to early warning tools).  
7 See eg A Sutton & R Setchim, ‘Valuing Sponsor Support’ (2014) 19 Brit Actuarial J 404, 405. 
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by an officeholder (be that a trustee, liquidator, or receiver), take control of and liquidate 
the assets before dividing the proceeds among themselves.8 Recognition, however, has 
grown of the importance of value maximization at whichever point on the demise curve 
the formal intervention occurs. As a result, business insolvency systems have evolved to 
offer a spectrum of possibilities – including formal reorganization or rehabilitation 
proceedings at intermediate points on the spectrum between the extremes – with some 
facility to convert from one procedure to another, or to combine various procedures, 
depending on the circumstances.  
Since the Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s, international institutions such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, and UNCITRAL have actively championed reforms 9  that 
provide formal rehabilitation alternatives to a contractual workout or a liquidation, 
incorporating features such as a stay on creditor enforcement to prevent runs on the assets, 
and mechanisms for the authorization of post-commencement financing, the proposal, 
approval and court confirmation of formal plans of reorganization, and the conversion of 
rehabilitation to liquidation proceedings in the event that the debtor fails to have a plan 
confirmed.10 These institutions now regard insolvency systems offering a broader spectrum 
of informal and formal debt resolution procedures as critical in promoting access to 
affordable credit and financial stability.11 Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code has been 
particularly influential in this process12 and has been almost elevated to the status of a 
global template for formal reorganization law,13 although international standards have been 
designed flexibly to accommodate different legal systems at varying stages of economic 
development. 
Pre-insolvency proceedings, at their core, inhabit a space on the spectrum 
somewhere between a pure contractual workout and a formal insolvency or rehabilitation 
proceeding. They are restructuring proceedings that corporate debtors can access before 
they become insolvent with the aim of avoiding insolvency. They entail a surgical debt 
restructuring and an early intervention at the first signs of distress, concentrating on 																																																								
8 See JL Westbrook et al, A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (The World Bank 2010) 126-29. 
9  See International Monetary Fund, Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures (1999) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly>; The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems (Revised 2015) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/the-world-bank-
principles-for-effective-insolvency-and-creditor-rights>; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Parts One and 
Two (United Nations 2005) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html>. 
10 See eg UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Two (United Nations 2005), 83-103, 113-119, 209-238.  
11 See eg The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (Revised 2015), 
iii (‘The ICR Principles support a sound insolvency and creditor/debtor rights…framework, which is crucial to promoting 
access to finance because it provides a predictable, transparent, and efficient framework to resolve debts in the context 
of business distress or failure… At the same time, access to credit has to be considered in the context of the 
overwhelming need for macro-financial stability. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the international community 
has a renewed interest in ensuring financial systems remain as sound and resilient as possible.’) 
12 In part because of the outsized influence of the United States on the Bretton-Woods institutions. See N Woods, ‘The 
United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and IMF’ in R 
Foot et al (eds), US Hegemony and International Organizations (Oxford 2003). 
13  For example, Singapore’s recent reforms to its corporate insolvency and restructuring laws in the Singapore 
Companies (Amendment) Act 2017 were heavily influenced by US chapter 11. See further Meng Seng Wee, ‘Whither 
the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore: More Chapter 11, Less Scheme?’ 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922956>; G McCormack & Wai Yee Wan, ‘Transplanting 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s Restructuring and Insolvency Laws: Opportunities and 
Challenges’ Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2018) 
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14735970.2018.1491680>. 
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financial creditors rather than creditors of the operating business, permitting no, or limited, 
court involvement, avoiding stigma and reputational damage. Such proceedings may 
preserve value better than later-stage intervention through formal insolvency proceedings 
that implicate all stakeholders, and almost invariably result in distressed asset sales of one 
form (liquidation, break up) or another (pre-pack designed to achieve a going concern, or 
at least a ‘better than liquidation’ outcome).14 Pre-insolvency proceedings are typically 
designed for use by debtors whose businesses are profitable, in that operating revenues 
exceed operating expenses, but whose balance sheets are overleveraged with the 
consequence that they will not be sufficiently profitable to repay their financial creditors 
as these creditors’ loans mature. They usually offer the prospect of effective early 
intervention in situations where contractual workouts are not possible because there is 
deadlock among creditors, by providing voting mechanisms that enable assenting 
majorities of creditors to bind dissenting ‘holdout’ creditors to the terms of a restructuring 
deal.15  
Across the spectrum, insolvency and restructuring law provides a comprehensive 
and dynamic series of ex post interventions. Viable companies with overleveraged capital 
structures can access deadlock resolution procedures and thus overcome obstacles to an 
informal workout.16 The businesses of companies that are more deeply distressed can be 
salvaged, and returns to creditors maximized, by means of a sale for the best price 
reasonably obtainable17 – be that at going concern value, ‘better than liquidation’ value or 
some point in between. Companies can attempt a restructuring and transition to a formal 
insolvency or rehabilitation proceeding to implement an asset sale if the restructuring is 
unsuccessful. Inevitably, though, there is blurriness in domestic legislative offerings – in 
other words, there are plenty of examples of hybrid proceedings that can function both as 
pre-insolvency restructuring proceedings and as formal rehabilitation proceedings that 
insolvent debtors and their creditors can use to salvage value at points further down the 
demise curve. 
As capital structures have come to be dominated by secured credit, urgent questions 
have arisen about the impact of secured creditor control on the choice between a 
restructuring or a sale and, where a sale is pursued, the timing of the sale.18 The primary 
sorting question – which companies should be restructured and which companies should 
have their assets sold – thus looms large and justifies a clear analytic distinction of the kind 
that Sarah Paterson draws between, on the one hand, proceedings aimed at rewriting the 																																																								
14 See Westbrook et al, Global View (n 8) 124-25. 
15 The existence of such easy-to-access, formal deadlock resolution procedures may conceivably promote informal 
workouts by facilitating bargaining in the shadow of the law. 
16 Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4), 702, 717 et seq. 
17 ibid. 
18 The main concern is that secured creditors are biased in favour of expedited sales free and clear of creditor claims 
through mechanisms such as 11 USC 363 that deprive junior creditors of the safeguards of a full reorganization plan 
process and the ability to share in downstream going concern value that a delayed sale or restructuring might otherwise 
have generated. See eg American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11 2012-2014 Final 
Report and Recommendations <http://commission.abi.org/full-report> 83-87, 137-38, 201-04; MB Jacoby and EJ 
Janger, ‘Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (2014) 123 Yale LJ 862; MB Jacoby, 
‘Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity’ (2018) 166 U Penn L Rev 1, 17-18; A Walters, ‘Statutory Erosion of Secured Creditors’ 
Rights: Some Insights from the United Kingdom’ 2015 U Ill L Rev 543, 544-46. A competing concern is that systems 
biased towards preventive restructuring incentivize ‘out of the money’ junior creditors to press for restructuring of 
firms that should be liquidated. See eg H Eidenmüller, ‘Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law’ in JN Gordon & WG 
Ringe (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (OUP 2018). 
	 5	
bargain between the debtor, its finance creditors and shareholders, and, on the other hand, 
formal insolvency and rehabilitation proceedings aimed at realizing the assets.19 But while 
insolvency and restructuring law deploys a range of different tools − some that pursue a 
restructuring outcome, some that pursue a sale outcome, some that function as hybrids – 
altogether these processes nevertheless amount to a comprehensive, unified body of law. 
That law addresses coordination problems for which private ordering alone does not 
provide effective solutions, with the goal of maximizing enterprise value across a sliding 
scale of situations ranging from anticipated to actual distress. 
Initiatives such as the EU’s Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks 
(‘the Directive’)20 are concerned with harmonization of domestic laws. But as many large 
restructurings transcend national boundaries, the purpose of our article is to consider the 
treatment of pre-insolvency proceedings in private international law. While, to date, cross-
border insolvency instruments have tended to define insolvency proceedings quite 
expansively, discussion of the cross-border implications of pre-insolvency proceedings – 
and, in particular, the normative case for treating them under the same umbrella of formal 
insolvency proceedings in private international law – is only just beginning.21  
This article first maps the contours of pre-insolvency proceedings (Section 2) and 
reviews how insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings are treated in current cross-border 
insolvency law (Section 3). It then seeks to contribute to the normative discussion. Section 
4 considers whether pre-insolvency proceedings should (or should continue to) be 
characterized as related to insolvency and be governed by the leading specialized cross-
border insolvency instruments and by the norm of modified universalism. The risk is over-
inclusivity of cross-border insolvency law, which, where it is based on universality and 
unity, might defeat contractual expectations. Thus, the alternative is to treat pre-insolvency 
proceedings as ‘contract like’ for the purpose of private international law characterization. 
However, we advance reasons why, in our view, we should be slow to exclude pre-
insolvency proceedings from cross-border insolvency law. At stake in the normative debate 
is the availability (or otherwise) of the tools and norms of cross-border insolvency law – 
foreign recognition, expansive foreign court relief, and international cooperation, 
coordination, and communication between courts and other actors (aspects of the 
overarching norm of modified universalism) – to assist and protect pre-insolvency 
proceedings overseas. At a conceptual level, we doubt whether legislatively mandated or 
‘state-supplied’22 deadlock resolution mechanisms, can properly be analogized for private 
international law purposes to consensual contract modifications. At a practical level, 
foreign court recognition, relief, and cooperation provide a necessary antidote to overseas 
manoeuvres by holdout creditors and are mechanisms that accommodate hybridity while 
also disfavouring procedural fragmentation. However, we do not see the ‘contract’ or 
‘insolvency’ question as purely binary. Instead, we proceed to argue in Section 5 that cross-
border insolvency law’s dominant norm – modified universalism – is sufficiently flexible 
that it can evolve to accommodate the peculiarities of pre-insolvency proceedings 																																																								
19 Paterson ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4) 702.  
20 See n 6. 
21 For two recent important contributions see H Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ (2018) 92 Am Bankr 
LJ 53; S Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency and 
Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 EBOR 615.  
22  See H Eidenmüller & K van Zwieten, ‘Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency’ (2015) 16 EBOR 625, 626. 
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successfully. Accordingly, while we suggest that cross-border insolvency law needs to be 
flexible, we see no compelling reason to change the current course or reinvent the wheel. 
 
2. PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: MAPPING THE CONTOURS 
 
This section identifies the main features and characteristics of pre-insolvency proceedings. 
It mainly draws on the influential chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and on the 
Directive. It contends that pre-insolvency proceedings have certain core characteristics but 
that, rather than necessarily standing alone, they may nest within broader, hybrid, multi-
purpose proceedings − something akin to a matryoshka doll where a smaller figure nests 
inside a larger figure. This pliable nature of pre-insolvency proceedings has important 
implications for the decision how to treat these proceedings in international cases.  
The aim of the Directive is ‘to establish a common EU-wide framework to ensure 
effective restructuring, second chance and efficient procedures both at national and cross-
border level.’23 The Directive builds on an earlier Recommendation that invited member 
states to introduce ‘effective pre-insolvency procedures to help viable debtors to restructure 
and thus avoid insolvency.’24 From these pronouncements we can discern the first three 
core characteristics of pre-insolvency proceedings. First, they are formal in the sense that 
their effectiveness depends on a statutory mandate and not purely on private ordering. 
Second, they are primarily debt restructuring proceedings rather than proceedings for 
realizing assets and distributing proceeds, albeit, asset disposal may be contemplated as 
part of the restructuring.25 Third, they are proceedings that are available to debtor firms 
before they are factually insolvent – in other words, before their financial condition has 
deteriorated so deeply that they meet the statutory predicates (insolvency on a cash-flow 
and/or balance sheet basis) – that are thresholds to entry into formal insolvency or 
rehabilitation proceedings in many legal systems.26 A fourth core characteristic that relates 
to the third is that pre-insolvency proceedings may be debtor-in-possession proceedings – 
entry into the proceedings might not result in the replacement of the debtor’s incumbent 
management by an officeholder such as an administrator or a liquidator. Thus, there is a 
positive incentive for managers to use pre-insolvency proceedings with this characteristic 
to address anticipated difficulties at an early stage because they will not lose control by 
doing so.27 Taking these four core characteristics as a whole, it is apt to describe pre-																																																								
23 The legal basis of the proposal is the removal of obstacles to the functioning of the single market that raise financing 
costs for European firms. The Commission contends that an efficient, harmonized preventive restructuring framework 
will increase lender recovery rates, reduce the volume of non-performing loans held by financial institutions, and thus 
increase access to cheap capital on a pan-European basis: Commission Proposal (n 6) 2-9, 12-15; H Eidenmüller, 
‘Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime’ (2017) 18 EBOR 273, 277 et seq. 
24 Commission Proposal (n 6) 7. The EU Commission concluded that the adoption of the Recommendation in 2016 had 
‘not led to the desired impact in terms of consistent changes across all Member States’: ibid, 8. Hence, the move 
towards more aggressive minimum standards harmonization in the form of a Directive. 
25 Directive (n 6) art 2(1) (defining ‘restructuring’ as ‘measures aimed at restructuring the debtor’s business that 
include changing the composition, conditions or structure of a debtor’s assets and liabilities or any other part of the 
debtor’s capital structure, such as sales of assets or parts of the business and, where so provided by national law, the 
sale of the business as a going concern, as well as any necessary operational changes, or a combination of those 
elements’). 
26 Westbrook et al, Global View (n 8) 65-68. See also A Gurrea-Martínez, ‘The Future of Reorganization Procedures in 
the Era of Pre-Insolvency Law <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290366>. 
27 Corporate and insolvency laws may also create negative incentives to early voluntary formal intervention in the form 
of directors’ liability provisions. See further Westbrook et al, Global View (n 8) 53-60; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
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insolvency proceedings as ‘a legal framework that allows firms to readjust their capital 
structure well before they are in fact insolvent.’28 
Pre-insolvency proceedings are thus designed to provide economically viable firms 
with a formal mechanism through which they can deleverage their balance sheets by 
renegotiating and concluding a new deal with their principal financial creditors on more 
favourable terms. The deal may involve one or more of a variety of refinancing techniques 
such as extended loan maturities (meaning that debt can be repaid later), reduced interest 
payments, reduced payments of principal indebtedness (commonly referred to as debt 
write-downs or ‘haircuts’) or agreements to exchange debt for equity (which have the 
combined effect of reducing principal indebtedness and reducing debt service costs in 
return for creditors sharing future ‘upside’ with owners).29 When distress is on the horizon, 
it makes sense for firms to try to renegotiate with their financial creditors before the debt 
matures or accelerates because contractual events of default in the finance documents are 
triggered.  
The renegotiation has traditionally taken the form of an out-of-court workout30 in 
which the parties agree by contract to modify the terms of the existing debt or exchange it 
for fresh, less expensive, obligations. But workouts require unanimous consent or, where 
there is a collective action clause in the inter-creditor agreement that forms part of the 
original financing package, the consent of a prescribed super-majority of creditors. As 
such, while they can be successful, they are prone to holdout problems – creditors blocking 
the deal and using leverage to extract additional benefits for themselves – and ‘free rider’ 
problems – creditors who decline to participate, so that they are not bound by the workout 
terms, and yet who enjoy the prospect of full payment because concessions made by other 
creditors improve the debtor’s financial health.31 The market has devised partial solutions, 
such as collective action clauses, exit consents, and consent fees, that go some way to 
addressing these coordination problems.32 However, to ensure that holdout and free rider 
problems can be overcome decisively, formal restructuring alternatives are required to 
protect the debtor against the disruptive threat of premature enforcement33 and to bind all 
creditors, including dissenters, to the terms of the restructuring deal. Pre-insolvency 
proceedings therefore mirror workouts in important respects. They provide a framework 
that facilitates ‘structured bargaining’34 over new financing terms between the debtor’s 																																																								
Insolvency Law, Part Four: Directors’ Obligations in the Period Approaching Insolvency (United Nations 2013). The goal 
of this combination of sticks (liability) and carrots (access to a debtor-in-possession restructuring proceeding) is to 
discourage managers from burying their heads in the sand. 
28 Eidenmüller, ‘Contracting’ (n 23) 274. 
29 On the trend in post-crisis debt for equity swaps in the UK restructuring market see S Paterson, ‘Debt Restructuring 
and Notions of Fairness’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 600, 611-12. 
30 See generally Westbrook et al, Global View (n 8) ch 5. 
31  See eg R Antonoff, ‘Out-Of-Court Debt Restructuring and the Problem of Holdouts and Free Riders’ in The 
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel (October 2013) 17; Eidenmüller & van Zwieten, ‘Restructuring’ (n 22) 631. 
32 For judicial consideration of consent fees, see eg Azevedo v IMCOPA – Importacao, Exportaacao e Industria de Oleos 
Ltda [2012] EWHC 1849 (Comm) (Hamblen J). For judicial consideration of exit consents, see eg Assénagon Asset 
Management SA v Irish Bank Resolution Corpn Ltd [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch), [2013] 1 All ER 495 (Briggs J).  
33 Though as Sarah Paterson has demonstrated, there is commonly a functional stay in a financial restructuring arising 
from a combination of contractual provisions that collectivize enforcement in the event of actual or potential default, 
stakeholder incentives, and the liquidity offered by distressed debt markets, which provide an exit route for financial 
creditors who can crystallize their losses without resorting to enforcement. See Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate 
Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4), 713-4. 
34 Eidenmüller, ‘Contracting’ (n 23) 280, 289. 
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managers and creditors prior to insolvency. They also permit, through a combination of 
deadlock resolution voting mechanisms and formal confirmation by a court or 
administrative authority, the imposition of majority-approved restructuring deals on 
dissenting or non-participating minorities in a manner that overcomes the potential 
obstacles to a successful workout.   
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code has been influential in the 
development of pre-insolvency proceedings globally.35 While, it is natural to think of 
chapter 11 as an insolvency proceeding, it was designed to promote restructuring by 
encouraging firm managers to negotiate and confirm a plan of reorganization under 
bankruptcy court oversight36 within the shelter provided by a statutory moratorium – the 
automatic stay.37 Firms filing voluntarily can access chapter 11 – a debtor-in-possession 
proceeding38 – without having to establish that they are factually insolvent.39 Managers 
control the direction of the case subject to bankruptcy court oversight and other institutional 
constraints. For example, the debtor-in-possession has a 120-day exclusivity period during 
which it – and it alone – can file a draft plan of reorganization,40 and it remains free to 
continue running the business in the ordinary course without the need for court approval 
of its day-to-day operations.41  
Moreover, chapter 11 contains elaborate mechanisms for deadlock resolution 
pursuant to which a plan of reorganization can be imposed on dissenting stakeholders 
through a mechanism known as ‘whole class cramdown’ as long as at least one impaired 
class votes in favour 42  and the plan meets various statutory requirements, including 
requirements that the plan is feasible,43 does not unfairly discriminate, and is fair and 																																																								
35 11 USC ss 1101-1174. 
36 Comparatists tend to exaggerate the extent of court oversight in the American system. See eg D Baird, ‘The New Face 
of Chapter 11’ (2004) 12 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 69, 92 (‘[The judge] acts only when a party files a motion or makes an 
objection. Negotiations remain the lifeblood of bankruptcy, and practices evolve out of view to the bankruptcy judge’). 
However, nuanced empirical studies have demonstrated that bankruptcy judges do employ active case management 
techniques in varying degrees in chapter 11 cases. See MB Jacoby, ‘What Should Judges Do In Chapter 11?’ [2015] U Ill 
L Rev 571.  
37 Which arises automatically on filing: 11 USC s 362. 
38 The debtor-in-possession can be displaced by a trustee on a showing of cause (including eg fraud, dishonesty, 
incompetence, or gross mismanagement): 11 USC 1104(a). Such appointments are rare. 
39 Debtor eligibility is defined by 11 USC s 109(a), (b), (d).  11 USC s 301 provides that eligible debtors can commence a 
voluntary case by filing a bankruptcy petition with the court. There is no insolvency requirement. Instead, there is a 
power to dismiss a chapter 11 case for ‘cause’ under s 1112(b) which has been used to fashion a ‘bad faith filing’ 
dismissal standard designed to flush out cases that lack a valid reorganizational purpose. See eg In re SGL Carbon 
Corporation 200 F 3d 154 (3rd Cir 1999); In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc 384 F 3d 108 (3rd Cir 2004). 
40 11 USC s 1121(b). 
41 Court approval is required if the debtor-in-possession wishes to use, sell, or lease estate property other than in the 
ordinary course of business.  Court approval is also needed before the debtor-in-possession can use, sell, or lease cash 
collateral. See 11 USC s 363(b)(1), (c)(2). 
42 The claims of affected stakeholders are divided into classes for purposes of treatment and voting: 11 USC s 1122(a). 
Impaired classes – that is classes whose proposed plan treatment is inferior in some respect to their expected treatment 
outside of chapter 11 – get to vote on the plan and if a majority in number of claims comprising two-thirds in amount 
in each class votes in favour, the plan is accepted: 11 USC ss 1124, 1126(c). A class of claims is a creditor class. A class 
of interests – that is, a class of equity holders – accepts a plan if the holders of two-thirds in amount of the interests 
votes in favour. See 11 USC s 1126(d). 
43  The so-called feasibility requirement in 11 USC 1129(a)(11) requires a plan proponent to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of evidence that confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or need for 
further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or 
reorganization is proposed in the plan. 
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equitable in its treatment of dissenting classes. The court’s confirmation of the plan is the 
source of its legally binding effects. It operates to discharge the firm’s pre-bankruptcy 
obligations and replace them with new obligations under the plan.44 
On paper, then, the chapter 11 model blends debtor-in-possession and low-barrier-
to-entry features. It is designed to encourage early and easy access. It provides a statutory 
moratorium, plan voting, and confirmation mechanisms aimed at curbing opportunistic 
creditor behavior. As originally conceived, it is biased towards restructuring rather than 
asset sales,45 and includes safeguards designed to protect dissenting minorities in the plan 
voting and confirmation process, and to balance the interests of creditors who would prefer 
to crystallize their loss rather than wait for their money.46  
In truth, chapter 11 is a hybrid of a pre-insolvency restructuring proceeding and a 
formal rehabilitation procedure. Indeed, as financial markets have changed over time,47 
and as practice has evolved in response, chapter 11 has come to function as a multi-purpose 
‘one-stop’ shop. As well as wholesale reorganizations implicating all stakeholders (finance 
creditors, trade creditors, tort creditors) that may incorporate operational restructuring (ie 
changes to the business model) and extensive refinancing – chapter 11’s original raison 
d’etre – it comfortably accommodates pre-packaged or pre-arranged financial 
restructurings, approximating to workouts.48 This type of ‘skinny’ restructuring, which is 
more limited in scope than a wholesale reorganization, affects only the finance creditors 
and often leaves the trade creditors of the operating business untouched. Skinny 
restructurings are close analogues to the kind of balance sheet restructurings that can be 
consummated in the UK, for example, through creditors’ schemes of arrangement. 49 
Indeed, skinny restructuring is the main territory of pre-insolvency proceedings in practice. 
But as well as a range of restructuring outcomes, chapter 11 can also be used to 
accomplish court-approved sales that are functionally equivalent to various formal 
insolvency proceedings, for example, the UK administration sale.50 Here too, there are 																																																								
44 11 USC ss 1141(d), 1142(a). We note in passing that the UK’s creditors’ scheme of arrangement, which has all the 
core characteristics of a pre-insolvency proceeding (formal court sanction, restructuring goal, no insolvency 
requirement, no effect on the legal status or authority of the debtor’s management), does not have a cross-class 
cramdown feature. All classes must approve the scheme by the requisite statutory majorities before the court will 
sanction it. See Companies Act 2006 ss 896(1), 899(1). Perhaps in an attempt to preserve the UK’s comparative 
advantage in the European restructuring market, the UK government is proposing to introduce a new restructuring 
procedure, modelled on the scheme of arrangement, which will incorporate a cross-class cramdown feature and a 
flexible approach to absolute priority. See Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Insolvency and 
Corporate Governance – Government response (26 August 2018) 63-75. Debtors can currently cram down whole classes 
but only by twinning a scheme with a pre-packaged administration sale: see text to nn 152-54. 
45 Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4) 715. 
46 As well as various policy-based exceptions to the automatic stay in 11 USC s 362(b), the bankruptcy court may grant 
relief from stay for cause or, insofar as the stay bars enforcement of rights to property, where the debtor does not have 
equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization: 11 USC s 362(d). 
47 Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4). 
48  D Connolly, ‘Current Issues Involving Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Plans’ (2004) Ann Surv of Bankr Law 2, 
Eidenmüller, ‘Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law’ (n 18). 
49 Companies Act 2006, Pt 26. For a sample of the now extensive literature on schemes see A Hargovan, ‘The Source of 
Efficacy for Creditors’ Schemes of Arrangement in England, Australia and Singapore’ (2010) 31 Comp Law 199; R 
Olivares-Caminal et al, Debt Restructuring (2nd edn, OUP 2016);  J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and 
Forum Shopping’ (2013) 14 EBOR 563; J Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring in English Law: Lessons from the United States and 
the Need for Reform’ (2014) 130 LQR 282; J Payne, Schemes of Arrangement: Theory, Structure and Operation 
(Cambridge 2014); J Payne, ‘The Role of the Court in Debt Restructuring’ (2018) 77 CLJ 124. 
50 See UK Insolvency Act 1986, Part II and Schedule B1. 
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several possibilities. The court can approve a sale as part of a confirmed plan,51 or, prior to 
plan confirmation under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, in which case the sale is 
conjoined with a so-called liquidating plan, which becomes a vehicle for distributing the 
sale proceeds.52 More controversially, debtors-in-possession, invariably at the behest of 
their senior creditors,53 have pushed the envelope of the section 363 power to carry out 
quick going concern whole-of-firm sales without any kind of accompanying plan process. 
In these cases, after the sale, the debtor will either convert to a liquidation or simply get 
the chapter 11 case dismissed.54 Critics object that section 363 whole-of-firm sales, which 
courts review on a deferential business judgment standard, do an end run around chapter 
11’s plan protections for dissenting creditors and dissenting classes.55 Be that as it may, 
chapter 11 is at root a pre-insolvency proceeding – it has the four core characteristics we 
identified earlier 56  –although in practice, it is a hybrid restructuring and insolvency 
proceeding through which debtors and creditors can engineer a range of outcomes (skinny 
financial restructurings, wholesale reorganizations, asset sales followed by a distribution).  
Chapter 11, through its debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing provisions,57  also 
provides a platform for the investment of new money in the firm to ensure continuity while 
a plan is negotiated. Subject to court approval, these provisions permit the firm to grant 
new lenders priming liens that confer priority on the new lender over existing lienholders. 
As such, the Bankruptcy Code establishes a backstop framework for resolving inter-
creditor issues relating to the terms on which senior creditors will provide ongoing liquidity 
to the firm’s operating business. In practice, the DIP financing provisions create 
governance leverage through which DIP lenders can control the course of the case.58 But 
for our purposes, they underscore the point that chapter 11 has always been much more 
than just a voting mechanism to accomplish a skinny restructuring before the debtor begins 
its descent down the demise curve. The Bankruptcy Code’s elaborate provisions preventing 
ipso facto termination of contracts and empowering the debtor-in-possession to assume or 
reject its executory contracts and leases further illustrate chapter 11’s breadth and 
hybridity.59 
In setting a base line for minimum harmonization, the EU’s emerging conception 
of pre-insolvency proceedings draws on chapter 11’s model.60 Thus, the focus on so-called 																																																								
51 11 USC s 1123(a)(5)(D). 
52 SD Cousins, ‘Chapter 11 Asset Sales’ (2002) 27 Del J Corp L 835. 
53 Text to n 18.  
54 A so-called structured dismissal: see NL Pernick & GD Dean, ‘Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and Growing 
Alternative After Asset Sales’ (2010) 29 Am Bankr Inst J, June 2010, at 1, 58-59. 
55 Such sales are commonly approved on the theory that the debtor firm is a ‘melting ice cube’ and the decision to sell 
quickly is therefore a reasonable commercial decision. Junior creditors left out of the money may well object that a 
restructuring, rather than a sale, would generate value that they could share in through the plan process. See further 
Jacoby & Janger (n 18).  
56 Text to nn 23-27. 
57 11 USC s 364. For background see DA Skeel, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ (2004) 
25 Cardozo L Rev 1905. International standard setters lay great store on post-commencement financing and barely 
disguise their admiration for the US DIP finance model. See IMF, Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures (n 9) sec 4 
under the heading ‘Post-commencement Financing’; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (n 9) 113-19. 
58 Skeel (n 57); R Phelan & O Tama, ‘The Use of DIP Financing as a Mechanism to Control the Corporate Restructuring 
Process’ (2011) 44 Tex J Bus L 15; American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11 (n 18) 73-
83.  
59 11 USC s 365. 
60 Eidenmüller, ‘Contracting’ (n 23) 291 (‘[The Commission proposal] looks like a Chapter 11 proceeding without strong 
court involvement from the beginning and without the tools needed for the court to guarantee a fair outcome of the 
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pre-insolvency proceedings, in the form of processes akin to chapter 11, is becoming 
significantly widespread, although these are unlikely to emerge as a one-size-fits-all or a 
single uniform template for restructuring. The Directive’s base line model possesses the 
core characteristics identified at the beginning of this Section. It would require member 
states to ensure that, ‘where there is a likelihood of insolvency, debtors in financial 
difficulty have access to an effective preventive restructuring framework that enables them 
to restructure their debts or business’.61 Thus, factual insolvency is not a pre-condition to 
access (third characteristic) 62  and restructuring, rather than liquidation of assets and 
distribution of proceeds among creditors, is the outcome contemplated (second 
characteristic). The EU model is formal (first characteristic) in that it contains rules on plan 
contents, class formation, valuation, and voting, and requires member states to ensure that 
restructuring plans which affect the interests of dissenting parties, or which provide for 
new financing, can only become binding if they are confirmed by a judicial or 
administrative authority.63  The fourth characteristic – debtor-in-possession – is also a 
default feature.64 However, the Directive does also contemplate partial DIP models in 
which officeholders may – and in some situations must – be appointed to oversee the case.65 
The proceedings contemplated by the Directive bear some resemblance to chapter 
11 but are far from identical to it. For example, chapter 11’s automatic stay and DIP 
financing provisions are significantly watered down and, some of the proposed standards, 
such as the ‘likelihood of insolvency’ access standard, retain, as one would expect, a 
distinctly European character that reflects compromises among the EU institutions and the 
member states.66 The Directive seeks to minimize court involvement in the interests of 
																																																								
process’); McCormack, ‘Corporate Restructuring Law’ (n 6) 537 (‘There are undoubtedly strong similarities between the 
European restructuring proposals and Ch.11’). 
61 Directive (n 6) art 4(1). For background see Commission Proposal (n 6) 37; Council Position (n 6) 54. 
62 Directive (n 6) recital (24)) (‘A restructuring framework should be available before a debtor becomes insolvent under 
national law, namely before the debtor fulfils the conditions under national law for entering collective insolvency 
proceedings…’). The Directive contemplates the possibility of access limitations in the form of a viability test while, at 
the same time, permitting member states, should they wish, to extend the scope of preventive restructuring 
frameworks to ‘situations in which debtors face non-financial difficulties, provided that such difficulties give rise to a 
real and serious threat to a debtor’s actual or future ability to pay its debts as they fall due.’ See Directive, art 4(3), 
recital (28). This reflects a compromise between member states concerned that non-viable debtors would use 
preventive proceedings to delay entry into full insolvency proceedings and thus risk diminishing the value of the estate 
and member states who favour easy access to preventive proceedings. For background see Commission Proposal (n 6) 
28; Council Position (n 6) 3. 
63 Directive (n 6) arts 8-10, 14-15. 
64 ibid art 5. 
65 ibid art 5(2), (3) . Member states have the option to provide for the appointment of a practitioner on a case by case 
basis except where national law insists on a mandatory appointment. This reflects the range of accumulated experience 
that European jurisdictions have with partial DIP or hybrid models. For example, an insolvency practitioner must be 
appointed to act as nominee and supervisor of a UK company voluntary arrangement, and in a French sauvegarde 
proceeding the court usually appoints an administrator to assist with or supervise the debtor’s negotiations with 
creditors. See Weil Comparative Guide to Restructuring Procedures 2012 28, 44 < https://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/international/weil-comparative-guide-to-restructuring-procedures/>.  On the French law 
resonances in the Commission’s original proposal for the Directive, see further McCormack ‘Corporate Restructuring 
Law’ (n 6) 544. As a minimum, the Directive requires member states to provide for appointment of a practitioner in 
three situations enumerated in article 5(3), including cases involving cross-class cramdown. 
66 Concern for managerial abuse – a key variable in explaining Europe’s historic antipathy towards debtor-in-possession 
regimes – has not entirely gone away: see n 62 above. Additionally, concern that directors will fail to act quickly enough 
is present too: Directive (n 6) art 19. 
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efficiency and cost-effectiveness67 and arguably, therefore, provides the basis for a suite of 
cheaper European alternatives to the American system in which the institutional role of the 
court and of creditors’ committees comes with a considerable price tag. Formal court 
sanction is therefore a feature of the EU model, but the role of the court is expected to be 
more ‘light touch’. 
In summary, at its core a pre-insolvency proceeding is a form of voting mechanism 
by which a debtor can seek to avoid insolvency by imposing a debt (usually balance sheet) 
restructuring on holdout creditors. Yet, while chapter 11-like processes can be deployed as 
pre-insolvency proceedings in the manner just described, they are really hybrid 
restructuring and insolvency proceedings that debtors (whether already insolvent or in 
anticipation of insolvency) can use to reallocate or realize firm value in various ways, 
which, for simplicity, we have characterized as skinny restructurings, wholesale 
reorganizations and sales. Insofar as it approximates to a ‘chapter 11-lite’ model, the 
Directive would create the legal foundation for the continued emergence of a range of 
European restructuring proceedings with considerable variance in design and detail68	and 
potential also for hybridity. This point is important because hybridity presents considerable 
challenges of characterization from a private international law perspective. 
 
 
3. THE TREATMENT OF PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN CURRENT 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW 
 
3.1. Legal framework 
 
The current global framework for coordinating cross-border insolvencies is still 
patchy in situations where it relies on a transnational web of domestic private international 
laws. But considerable progress has been made towards harmonization of the private 
international law of insolvency mainly through two instruments: the EU Insolvency 
Regulation (recast) (‘EIR’)69 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
Law (‘Model Law’).70 Domestic versions of the Model Law have been enacted by 46 
jurisdictions to date,71 including key jurisdictions with large financial markets such as the 
																																																								
67 Directive (n 6) recital (29), art 4(6).   
68 For example, as to the extent of court oversight. On the court’s role in restructuring proceedings see generally J 
Payne, ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 49).  
69  Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L141/19, which applies to insolvency 
proceedings opened after 26 June 2017. The recast replaces the original Insolvency Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1346/2000 [2000] OJ L160/1. 
70 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) (‘Model Law’) with Guide to Enactment (2013), UN Sales No 
E 14 V2 (2014) (‘Guide to Enactment’). The Model Law framework is also being expanded as new model laws have been 
developed to close certain gaps in the system. See the new Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Insolvency-Related Judgments (UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related 
Judgments with Guide to Enactment (2019) < https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-
documents/uncitral/en/ml_recognition_gte_e.pdf>) and the forthcoming Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency 
(https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/966>, Annex, Draft model law on enterprise group insolvency). 
71  For the current list of jurisdictions with Model Law enactments see 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html>.    
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United States,72 the United Kingdom,73 and Singapore.74 These two instruments seek to 
avoid a costly multiplicity of proceedings and promote centralized, coordinated, and 
therefore value-maximizing, resolution of cross-border cases. 
The EIR harmonizes rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
international effect of insolvency proceedings and insolvency-related judgments 
throughout the EU. The Model Law creates a framework for international recognition and 
relief of eligible proceedings.75 Its aim is to promote harmonization through unilateral 
country adoptions of the transnational system as well as shared interaction and practice 
among enacting states over time.76  
 The norm animating both instruments is modified universalism. Modified 
universalism’s core tenet is a centralizing principle which gives primacy to a ‘main’ 
proceeding conducted in the jurisdiction where the debtor has its ‘home country’ and places 
courts in other jurisdictions in a supporting role. Under modified universalism, the ‘main’ 
proceedings’ court is the hub of the wheel and other courts assist the ‘main’ proceeding so 
as to centralize the administration of the debtor’s estate as far as possible.77 Modified 
universalism holds that courts should strive to achieve ‘unity’ (a single forum) and 
‘universality’ (a single applicable insolvency law) when it is the most efficient approach, 
and take a global perspective, with the aim of creating market symmetry between the cross-
border insolvency system and transnational commercial reality. 78  But modified 
universalism acknowledges that a fully universalist system − a single, unitary, worldwide 
proceeding administered in all cases from the debtor’s ‘home’ jurisdiction, under ‘home’ 
law − does not always fit the enterprise structure and its geographical spread, and does not 
take account of differences in jurisdictions’ capacity and level of adherence to minimum 
standards regarding insolvency.79 The EU and global instruments (by which we mean the 
various instruments promulgated by UNCITRAL, primarily the Model Law) 80  that 																																																								
72 11 USC ss 1501-1532. 
73  Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1030 (Great Britain); Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2007 SI 2007/115 (NI) pursuant to Northern Ireland’s devolution arrangements. 
74 Companies (Amendment) Act 2017 s 50, amending the Companies Act 1967 (revised edition 2006) by inserting a 
Singaporean Model Law enactment as the tenth schedule. 
75 A Walters, ‘Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in the Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law’ 
(2019) 93 Am Bankr LJ 47. 
76 A Dawson, ‘Modularity in Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2018) 93 Chi-Kent L Rev 677, 678 (‘Nations that adopt the Model 
Law commit themselves to coordinate with foreign bankruptcy proceedings whenever a foreign bankruptcy 
trustee…opens a proceeding under the Model Law. Such a model law effort has network effects, with greater value the 
more widely it is adopted’). 
77 ibid 684 (‘Modified universalism…creates a hub-and-spoke model of cross-border insolvency with a “full” bankruptcy 
proceeding in one jurisdiction and ancillary proceedings around the perimeter’). 
78  Leading universalists advocate for courts to interpret the Model Law as a ‘systems’ text that establishes an 
institutional and procedural framework for accomplishing a centralizing goal. In substance, this is an exhortation to 
judges to default to a universalist interpretation to fill gaps where they are not obviously constrained from so doing. 
See JL Westbrook, ‘Interpretation Internationale’ (2015) 87 Temple L Rev 739 and ‘Global Insolvency Proceedings for a 
Global Market: The Universalist System and the Choice of a Central Court’ (2018) 96 Tex L Rev 1473; and further 
discussion by Dawson (n 76) 679 and Walters (n 75). 
79 Walters, ‘Modified Universalisms’ (n 75); Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) ch 1 (outlining the 
contours of modified universalism and recapping cross-border insolvency’s ‘universalism’ versus ‘territorialism’ 
debate). 
80 See also the new model law on the enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and the forthcoming model law on 
enterprise groups insolvency (n 70). These models aim to complement the Model Law and to close gaps to facilitate 
recognition and relief of insolvency-related judgments and to promote group solutions, including when the COMI of 
group members is located in different jurisdictions (see Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) 221-236). 
	 14	
generally accord with modified universalism reflect a realistic approach to the 
administration of cross-border insolvency. At the core of the EIR and the Model Law is the 
notion of a debtor’s COMI (centre of main interests) where the main proceedings should 
be opened (under the EIR) or that should be recognized as the main proceedings (under the 
Model Law). Additional ‘secondary’ proceedings may be opened, however, under the EU 
system or ‘non-main’ proceedings may be recognized under the Model Law. The 
instruments also provide certain safeguards that reflect the persistence of national legal 
orderings, in particular a standard public policy ground for denial of recognition and/or 
relief.81  
 In practice, the cross-border insolvency instruments streamline the basis on which 
the effects of a proceeding in the debtor’s ‘home’ jurisdiction can be extended beyond that 
jurisdiction. This way, assets in other jurisdictions can be protected from individual 
enforcement and marshalled, and restructuring plans approved by the ‘home’ court can be 
globally enforced. As well as creating a framework of private international law rules for 
insolvency, the instruments also promote a wider culture of international cooperation by 
establishing extensive duties of cooperation and communication between courts and 
between practitioners.82  
  
3.2. Proceedings eligible for assistance & cooperation under cross-border insolvency law: 
definitions and predicates 
 
The threshold question is: what proceedings fall within the scope of the current cross-
border insolvency instruments? In other words, how do these instruments separate the 
proverbial sheep (eligible proceedings) from the proverbial goats (ineligible proceedings)? 
We consider the position under the Model Law and the EIR in turn. 
 
3.2.1. The Model Law 
 
The Model Law applies – and therefore its benefits become available – predominantly 
where a foreign court or foreign representative seeks assistance in the enacting state in 
connection with a ‘foreign proceeding’.83 A proceeding must be a ‘foreign proceeding’ to 
qualify for recognition.84 Article 2(b) defines ‘foreign proceeding’ as: 
 
[A] collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim 
proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs of 
the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization 
or liquidation. 
 
The definition is intended to be expansive85 and to encompass proceedings involving 
debtors that are in severe financial distress or insolvent, including proceedings accessible 																																																								
81 EIR, art 33; Model Law, art 6. 
82 EIR, arts 42-43; Model Law, arts 25-27. 
83 Model Law, art 1(a). 
84 ibid arts 15(1), 17(1)(a). Ultimately, only foreign main proceedings or foreign non-main proceedings qualify for 
recognition. See arts 2(b), (c), 17(2). Our article is concerned solely with the threshold question.   
85 Guide to Enactment, para 65 (‘The definitions of proceedings ... avoid the use of expressions that may have different 
technical meaning in different legal systems and instead describe their purpose or function. This technique is used to 
avoid inadvertently narrowing the range of possible foreign proceedings that might obtain recognition and to avoid 
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to debtors ‘that are or will be generally unable to pay their debts as they mature’.86 In 
principle, then, the Model Law can accommodate proceedings across the spectrum, 
including preventive and hybrid proceedings, and apply to them the sui generis private 
international law system of insolvency based on modified universalism.  
The commentary in the Model Law’s Guide to Enactment on each of the predicates 
– ‘collective’, ‘law relating to insolvency’, ‘debtor’s assets and affairs subject to the control 
or supervision of a court’, ‘liquidation or reorganization’ purpose  – supports a broad, 
inclusive reading. 87  The requirement for ‘collectivity’ rules out de facto collection 
proceedings that enable individual creditors or groups of creditors to enforce their claims, 
such as a receivership instigated by a secured creditor. 88  But proceedings are not 
necessarily ruled out because they leave a class of creditors’ rights unaffected: 
 
A proceeding should not be considered to fail the test of collectivity purely because a class of 
creditors’ rights is unaffected by it. An example would be insolvency proceedings that exclude 
encumbered assets from the insolvency estate, leaving those assets unaffected by the 
commencement of the proceedings and allowing secured creditors to pursue their rights outside of 
the insolvency law ….89  
 
In practice, ‘collectivity’ apparently would also not rule out skinny restructurings 
that address balance sheet liabilities while leaving the claims of operating creditors 
untouched on the argument that the restructuring affects, and affords due process rights, to 
all creditors included within its scope.90 A proceeding is not ruled out merely because it is 
conducted under a law that is not designated as an insolvency law or does not contain rules 
																																																								
unnecessary conflict with terminology used in the laws of the enacting State...’), 71 (‘Within the parameters of the 
definition of a foreign proceeding, a variety of collective proceedings would be eligible for recognition, be they 
compulsory or voluntary, corporate or individual, winding-up or reorganization. The definition would also include those 
proceedings in which the debtor retains some measure of control over its assets, albeit under court supervision...), 72 
(‘The Model Law recognizes that, for certain purposes, insolvency proceedings may be commenced under specific 
circumstances defined by law that do not necessarily mean the debtor is in fact insolvent...). 
86 ibid para 49 (emphasis added). See further paras 65 (‘…the expression “insolvency proceedings” may have a technical 
meaning in some legal systems, but is intended in subparagraph (a) to refer broadly to proceedings involving debtors 
that are in severe financial distress or insolvent.’), 67 (‘…the focus of the Model Law is upon severely financially 
distressed and insolvent debtors and the laws that prevent or address the financial distress of those debtors...). 
87 ibid paras 65-80. 
88 ibid para 69. In re Betcorp Ltd 400 BR 266, 281 (Bkrtcy D Nev 2009); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd 410 BR 357, 369-71 
(Bkrtcy EDNY 2009). See also In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd 480 BR 129 (Bkrtcy SDNY 2012). 
89 Guide to Enactment, para 70. This is, for example, the case in a winding-up under the Insolvency Act 1986, which is 
regarded in the law of England and Wales as a collective execution for unsecured creditors. See Buchler v Talbot [2004] 
UKHL 9, [2004] 2 AC 298 [28]-[30] (Lord Hoffmann), [51]-[52] (Lord Millett).  See also In re ABC Learning Centres Ltd 445 
BR 318 (Bkrtcy D Del 2010) (voluntary winding-up co-existing with receivership ‘collective’ as liquidators working to 
realize unencumbered assets, including avoidance and insolvent trading claims, for the benefit of unsecured creditors). 
90 See, in relation to UK schemes of arrangement, H Seife & F Vazquez, ‘US Courts Should Continue to Grant Recognition 
to Schemes of Arrangement of Solvent Insurance’ (2008) 17 Norton J of Bankr L & P 571, 576. The Guide to Enactment, 
para 78 rules out workouts (financial adjustment on a purely contractual basis) on the grounds that they ‘would 
generally not satisfy the requirement for collectivity nor for control or supervision by the court.’ We would rule them 
out because they are not ‘proceedings’: see Betcorp (n 88) 277-280, especially at 278 (‘In the context of corporate 
insolvencies, the hallmark of a “proceeding” is a statutory framework that constrains a company’s actions and that 
regulates the final distribution of a company’s assets’). Inevitably, there are questions at the margins, eg would a 
proceeding affecting a single class of noteholders be too skinny to qualify?  
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relating exclusively to insolvency.91 Function carries more weight than form. Thus, for 
example, a company law proceeding, like a UK scheme of arrangement, which can be used 
for solvent and distressed / insolvent restructurings may still be a ‘proceeding… pursuant 
to a law relating to insolvency’ under article 2(a) of the Model Law.92 While the debtor’s 
assets and affairs must be subject to the control or supervision of a court,93 control or 
supervision may be potential rather than actual and need not be exercised directly.94 A 
proceeding administered by an insolvency practitioner would still qualify as long as the 
insolvency practitioner is subject to court supervision.95 DIP and partial DIP proceedings, 
in which the debtor retains control over its assets subject to court oversight, are intended 
to qualify.96 The ‘liquidation or reorganization’ predicate is also prima facie broad enough 
to include proceedings that lead to one or more of a range of outcomes – break-up sales, 
going concern sales, wholesale restructurings, and skinny restructurings involving balance-
sheet ‘reorganization’97 – and therefore brings multi-purpose hybrid proceedings inside the 
tent. 
  
3.2.2. The EIR 
 
In its original version, the EIR, and the lapsed draft EU Convention on which it was 
based,98 applied to ‘collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total 
divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator’.99 This narrow definition, which 
required proceedings to be based on the debtor’s insolvency and not on other grounds,100 
reflected the liquidation and management displacement biases of European insolvency 
systems that were prevalent thirty years ago. The updated scope of the recast Regulation is 
broader and captures the institutionalization of rescue within European insolvency systems 
in the intervening years, while also foreshadowing the EU’s preventive restructuring 
																																																								
91 In re Agrokor dd [2017] EWHC 2791 (Ch), [2018] Bus LR 64 [55]. Agrokor and Betcorp support the proposition that a 
proceeding is pursuant to a law relating to insolvency if insolvency is one of the grounds on which the proceeding can 
be commenced. See Agrokor at [58]-[63]. 
92 We would contend that ‘law relating to insolvency’ is intended to include preventive proceedings designed to help a 
debtor avoid insolvency. Agrokor (n 91) provides some support for this proposition at [64]-[73]. The US and Singapore 
enactments of the Model Law put the point beyond doubt in their respective jurisdictions by expanding the predicate 
to read ‘a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt’. See 11 USC 101(23); Singapore Companies Act s 354B, Sch 
10, art 2(h); In re Avanti Communications Group plc 582 BR 603, 614 (Bkrtcy SDNY 2018). 
93 Guide to Enactment, para 76, Gold & Honey (n 88) 371.  
94 Guide to Enactment, para 74 (‘The Model Law specifies neither the level of control or supervision required to satisfy 
this aspect of the definition nor the time at which that control or supervision should arise. Although it is intended that 
the control or supervision required under subparagraph (a) should be formal in nature, it may be potential rather than 
actual...’). 
95 Ibid (‘…Control or supervision may be exercised not only directly by the court but also by an insolvency representative 
where, for example, the insolvency representative is subject to control or supervision by the court...’). 
96  ibid (‘… a proceeding in which the debtor retains some measure of control over its assets, albeit under court 
supervision, such as a debtor-in-possession would satisfy this requirement...’).  
97 ibid para 77 (which rules out proceedings that simply preserve assets but, by inference, and read in the context of 
the commentary as a whole is intended to be inclusive). 
98 See IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (n 2) 341-46. 
99 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1 art 1(1); M Virgos & E Schmit, 
Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, EU Council 6500/1/96, REV 1, DRS 8 (CFC) (1996) (‘Virgos-Schmit’) 
para 48. 
100 Virgos-Schmit (n 99) para 49. 
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initiative.101 Article 1(1) of the EIR, insofar as relevant to our present discussion, now reads 
as follows: 
 
This Regulation shall apply to public collective proceedings, including interim proceedings, which 
are based on laws relating to insolvency and in which, for the purpose of rescue, adjustment of debt, 
reorganization or liquidation: 
 
(a) a debtor is totally or partially divested of its assets and an insolvency practitioner is appointed; 
(b) the assets and affairs of a debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court; or 
(c) a temporary stay of individual enforcement proceedings is granted by a court or by operation 
of law, in order to allow for negotiations between the debtor and its creditors, provided that the 
proceedings in which the stay is granted provide for suitable measures to protect the general 
body of creditors, and, where no agreement is reached, are preliminary to one of the 
proceedings referred to in point (a) or (b). 
 
Where the proceedings referred to in this paragraph may be commenced in situations where there is 
only a likelihood of insolvency, their purpose shall be to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the 
cessation of the debtor’s business activities. 
 
Under the influence of the Model Law definition of ‘foreign proceeding’, aspects of which 
are apparent in the opening language of article 1(1), the recast Regulation’s scope is wide 
enough to encompass pre-insolvency, debtor-in-possession style proceedings as well as 
more traditional insolvency or rescue proceedings for which insolvency is a pre-
condition.102 Moreover, skinny restructurings affecting only some creditors are explicitly 
brought within the Regulation’s scope.103 On the flipside, as is also the case with the Model 
Law, out-of-court workouts are ‘out’: they are not ‘public’104 and do not involve court 
supervision or control. 
But despite cross-fertilization, the EIR and Model Law differ in important respects. 
First, while article 1(1) sets parameters, it is not dispositive. In the interests of legal 
certainty, the proceedings within the scope of the EIR are listed for each member state in 
Annex A, a practice that originated with the draft Bankruptcy Convention.105 The Court of 
Justice of the European Union has ruled that Annex A determines exhaustively whether or 																																																								
101 B Hess et al, European Insolvency Law – The Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna Report on the Application of Regulation 
No 1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (Beck Hart Nomos 2014) 24-67; P Omar, ‘Upstreaming Rescue: Pre-
Insolvency Proceedings and the European Insolvency Regulation’ [2014] 1 ICCLR 14; Eidenmüller & van Zwieten, 
‘Restructuring’ (n 22) 642 (‘The European Commission’s “preventative restructuring framework” for Member States is 
intended to operate in tandem with, and be complemented by, the jurisdictional and private international law 
framework set up by the EIR’). 
102  EIR, recital (10) (‘The scope of this Regulation should extend to proceedings which promote the rescue of 
economically viable but distressed businesses…It should…extend to proceedings which provide for restructuring of a 
debtor at a stage where there is only a likelihood of insolvency and to proceedings which leave the debtor fully or 
partially in control of its assets and affairs’). The Commission intends its proposed preventive insolvency framework 
and the recast Regulation to complement one another. See Commission Proposal (n 6) 9, Directive (n 6) recitals 12-13, 
and cf Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ (n 21) 59. 
103 EIR, recital (14) (‘The collective proceedings which are covered by this Regulation should include all or a significant 
part of the creditors to whom a debtor owes all or a substantial proportion of the debtor’s outstanding debts provided 
that the claims of those creditors who are not involved in such proceedings remain unaffected. Proceedings which 
involve only the financial creditors of a debtor should also be covered’); art 2(1) (defining ‘collective proceedings’ along 
similar lines). 
104 ibid recitals (12)-(13). 
105 ibid art 1(1) (last line), art 2(4); Virgos-Schmit (n 99) para 9 (‘Two Annexes to the Convention determine the national 
proceedings covered by the Convention. These Annexes form an integral part of the Convention). 
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not a national proceeding qualifies: if it’s on the list, it’s ‘in’ even where there are doubts 
about whether it meets the article 1(1) criteria;106 if it’s not on the list, it’s ‘out’.107 To 
update the Annex, countries must notify the Commission of changes to domestic law and 
request the amendment of Annex A so that it accurately reflects national notifications. On 
receiving such a request, the Commission reviews it and proposes a regulation to replace 
Annex A with an updated list. Thus, the Regulation has the character of an ‘opt in’ 
instrument in terms of the proceedings covered. If member states choose not to notify a 
particular proceeding, it will not be in Annex A and will therefore be outside the 
Regulation’s scope. 
Second, the Regulation attaches a formalistic meaning to ‘law relating to 
insolvency’. Recital (16) expressly rules out proceedings ‘based on general company law 
not designed exclusively for insolvency situations’. Thus, a multi-purpose Companies Act 
proceeding that can function as a pre-insolvency or insolvency proceeding, albeit non-
exclusively, is ‘out’. This goes some way to explaining why UK schemes of arrangement 
are outside the scope of the EIR108 despite routinely being recognized as eligible foreign 
proceedings by US courts under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the US enactment of 
the Model Law.109 
 
 
4. PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONTRACT OR INSOLVENCY? 
 
We saw in Section 3 that the trajectory of cross-border insolvency law as reflected in the 
key international instruments has generally kept track with the evolution of insolvency and 
restructuring law. If we leave aside the difference between the Model Law and the EIR 
concerning ‘law relating to insolvency’, the only resolution tools decisively beyond the 
pale are out-of-court workouts and creditor-initiated individual collection mechanisms. We 
can argue about whether ‘light touch’ preventive restructuring proceedings having the 
characteristics outlined in Section 2 are sufficiently public,110 sufficiently collective (where 
they affect only a narrow tranche of creditors), and sufficiently court supervised, but we 
suggest that the prevailing inclination of the law is towards inclusivity.  
This trend towards inclusivity raises normative questions. Is cross-border 
insolvency law over-inclusive? Should the tools of cross-border insolvency law be 																																																								
106 Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v Christianapol sp z oo EU:C:2012:739. 
107 Case C-461/11 Ulf Kazimierz Radziejewski v Kronofogdemyndigheten i Stockholm EU:C:2012:704; EIR, recital (9). The 
point is further illustrated by Agrokor (n 91). In Agrokor, the English High court recognized a Croatian extraordinary 
administration proceeding under an applicable Model Law enactment. The court could not recognize the Croatian 
proceeding under the Regulation because it was not listed in Annex A. 
108 See further S Block-Lieb, ‘Reaching to Restructure Across Borders (Without Over-Reaching), Even After Brexit’ (2018) 
92 Am Bankr LJ 1, 29. It is also worth noting that a number of ‘scheme-like’ proceedings that form part of the domestic 
insolvency and restructuring law of other EU member states are included in the Annex, eg the Spanish homologation 
proceeding and the Dutch suspension of payment proceeding (which can lead to a composition). 
109 Avanti Communications (n 92) 613. It can be argued, regardless of the Annex, that the assets and affairs of a scheme 
debtor are not subject to the control or supervision of a court within EIR, art 1(b): see Block-Lieb (n 108) 30. However, 
as the court is directly involved in convening meetings, signing off on class formation, and sanctioning the scheme, US 
courts applying the same language in 11 USC 101(23) have assumed, to date, that scheme debtors are, at very least, 
subject to court supervision. 
110 Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ (n 21) 59-60. 
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available to universalize the effects of a domestic pre-insolvency proceeding on foot in the 
jurisdiction of the debtor’s COMI? Should we redraw the boundaries and make cross-
border insolvency law less inclusive? Is it necessary, or at the very least desirable, for pre-
insolvency proceedings to receive international recognition, assistance and cooperation on 
much the same terms as insolvency proceedings? 
  
4.2. The ‘full collectivity’ theory 
 
It can be argued that the touchstone for universal applicability under cross-border 
insolvency law should be whether a proceeding is ‘fully’ collective. On one influential 
view, a proceeding is only fully collective where it deals with all creditors to resolve a 
common pool problem by restricting individual rights of enforcement either procedurally, 
by means of a stay, or substantively by modifying creditor entitlements.111 It follows from 
this view that insolvency law should only be permitted to override the legitimate 
expectations of creditors, including as regards the anticipated forum for, and law applicable 
to, the resolution of their claims, where the proceeding is fully collective.112 This full 
collectivity theory is primarily concerned to protect the private autonomy of contract 
creditors, expressed through forum selection and governing law clauses, from unjustified 
encroachment by the COMI jurisdiction’s insolvency law. 113  In short, under the full 
collectivity theory, unless the proceeding purports to deal procedurally or substantively 
with a situation of general default − that is, one that in some way addresses the claims of 
all creditors long term (finance) or short/medium term (operating) – they should be 
excluded. Thus, the US chapter 11 proceeding would be included because it imposes a wide 
stay and allows ‘forced modifications of creditors’ entitlements’,114 but the UK scheme of 
arrangement or the French procedure de financiére sauvegarde accélérée would be 
excluded, as these proceedings can be characterized as ‘not fully collective’, because their 
goal is restricted to accomplishing ‘an early financial restructuring of portions of creditors’ 
claims’.115 One important implication of full collectivity is that pre-insolvency proceedings 
designed to promote skinny financial restructuring should be treated as a species of de facto 
private resolution and the logic of contractual workouts should still prevail. 																																																								
111 Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ (n 21) 66-68. 
112 ibid 67-8, 70, 71. Eidenmüller particularly has in mind the automatic universalizing effects of the EIR. Strictly, as again 
he is careful to acknowledge (at 55), the effects of recognition are weaker under the Model Law. This is because (i) 
recognition in the Model Law does not automatically flow from the ‘home’ court’s claim to jurisdiction and (ii) the 
Model Law has no equivalent to the EIR’s applicable law provisions. Even so, jurisdictions that incline towards a strong 
theory of modified universalism do extend the overriding effects of the foreign insolvency law as a practical matter 
under the Model Law. The practice under chapter 15 of US courts granting permanent injunctions in aid of foreign 
reorganizations de facto extending foreign discharges to US territory is illustrative. See eg Avanti Communications (n 
92); In re Energy Coal SPA (2018) 582 BR 619. 
113 Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ (n 21) 70 (‘Nobody has to accept that [their] claim shall be reduced 
in a forum different from that which was contractually agreed or would be available under the non-insolvency rules of 
the applicable international civil procedure regime. Further, nobody has to accept a claim modification based on laws 
and regulations different from the law governing his or her claim’). The view seems to extend to the treatment non-
contract claimants might expect under ordinary private international law. 
114 ibid 68-9. 
115 ibid 69. Eidenmüller also excludes UK winding-up proceedings because they do not stay enforcement by secured 
creditors. On the same logic, he would presumably exclude company voluntary arrangements because they neither stay 
nor are capable of modifying the entitlements of secured and preferential creditors without their consent: see 
Insolvency Act 1986 s 4(3), (4). 
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4.3. The ‘separate domains / separate normative foundations’ theory 
 
Another way to address the trend towards over inclusiveness is to sever more sharply 
insolvency proceedings from restructuring proceedings and treat insolvency law and 
restructuring law as separate domains with separate functions and distinctive normative 
foundations.116 According to this ‘separate domains’ theory, the domain of insolvency law 
is asset realization proceedings that respond to a common pool problem whereas the 
domain of restructuring law is court-assisted agreements among stakeholders about future 
entitlements to future revenue streams. The former protects assets from a destructive 
enforcement race and provides instead for collective enforcement of claims against an 
insufficient pool of assets and distribution on liquidation principles. The latter involves a 
new bargain between the debtor and creditors about future revenues.117 Under this theory, 
a legal framework that supports structured bargaining over future value differs from a 
collective liquidation and distribution of assets because it responds to an anti-commons 
problem rather than a common pool problem.118 Accordingly, restructuring law ought 
properly to be based on contract and company law principles − with the law supplying 
deadlock resolution procedures to overcome the problem of holdout vetoes standing in the 
way of the new bargain – rather than on the distributive norms of liquidation law. 
 The separate domains theory does more than merely address the policy dilemma of 
cross-border characterization. It aims more widely to decouple restructuring law from 
liquidation principles (including the absolute priority rule) and ground it on the 
expectations of stakeholders outside of insolvency.119 We have much sympathy with the 
idea that the methodology for determining whether entitlements to future value in a 
restructuring have been allocated fairly and equitably should not be wedded to 
counterfactual liquidation outcomes. 120  However, we are concerned that the separate 
domains theory would carve out restructuring proceedings, including skinny restructurings 
and restructuring aspects of hybrid proceedings, 121  from the scope of cross-border 
insolvency law, leaving the cross-border issues to be resolved by ordinary private 
international law.  
 																																																								
116 See Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows’ (n 21).  
117 ibid section 3.2. 
118 A commons or common pool problem arises where uncoordinated individual exploitation of a freely accessible but 
limited resource will destroy the resource. An anti-commons problem arises where ownership rights are fragmented, 
and value is lost because individual owners can veto coordinated use of property with the result that it is under-utilized. 
See Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows’ (n 21) section 5.1. The seminal reference on anti-commons problems is MA Heller, 
‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111 Harv L Rev 621. See 
also MA Heller, The Gridlock Economy (Basic Books 2010). 
119 Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows’ (n 21) section 3.2. As such, Madaus seeks to shed the influence of US law and 
constitutionalize restructuring law on European legal foundations, which, in contrast to US law, permit impairment of 
contracts at state level: ibid section 4.2.5. 
120 This may be done within a unified body of insolvency and restructuring law. See, for example, Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (n 44) 71-74 (UK government proposals 
for a new restructuring proceeding that would incorporate a ‘best alternative’ valuation rather than a liquidation 
valuation methodology and a flexible approach to absolute priority). The Directive steers member states towards 
adoption of a relative priority rule under which a cross-class cramdown could be confirmed where ‘dissenting voting 
classes of affected creditors are treated at least as favourably as any other class of the same rank and more favourably 
than any junior class’. See ‘Council Position’ (n 6) 6; Directive (n 6) art 11(1)(c). But it permits member states to derogate 
from relative priority in favour of an absolute priority rule should they so wish. See Directive (n 6) art 11(2). 
121 Cf. Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows’ (n 21) section 4.3. 
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4.4. In defence of the emergent status quo 
 
We worry about under-inclusiveness for several reasons. First, insolvency and 
restructuring law may be best seen as a unified body of law – and a unified jurisdiction – 
which responds to various kinds of collective action problem with the goal of preserving 
and maximizing value. Against this backdrop, any move to exclude pre-insolvency 
proceedings from cross-border insolvency law runs into two problems: (i) restructuring 
cases higher up the demise curve will arise where debtors will need cross-border assistance 
and cooperation under existing cross-border insolvency instruments to accomplish 
desirable outcomes; and (ii) the legal response to situations of distress that have 
multinational elements will become fragmented according to the point on the demise curve 
where the intervention takes place or depending on the manner of the intervention. 
 The main case against inclusiveness in cross-border cases is that insolvency law 
and its related jurisdiction has no business overriding the private autonomy of contract 
debtors in restructuring contexts involving ‘contractualized’ or semi-contractual debt 
resolution. The objection is that the universal extension (and thus rigid over-reaching) of 
the COMI court’s law and jurisdiction harms the legitimate expectations of creditors who 
contracted for some other governing law and pre-selected some other forum for resolution 
of their (debtor-creditor and inter-creditor) disputes.122  
However, in skinny restructurings, the creditors are invariably sophisticated 
multinational parties whose expectations will be shaped as much by prevailing trends in 
the restructuring market as by contract. It will hardly come as any surprise to such creditors 
that a debtor in a state of pre-insolvency distress may seek to restructure in a venue 
conducive to achieving a favourable restructuring outcome in as efficient a manner as 
possible. To be sure, there may be concerns about abusive forum shopping – including the 
ability of debtors to migrate their COMIs and so displace privately agreed governing law 
and dispute resolution mechanisms with an ‘alien’ COMI state restructuring regime – but 
the reality is that it is difficult to achieve a successful restructuring without a sizeable 
majority of the debtor’s finance creditors on board. Those creditor majorities that are 
already onside with the restructuring effort invariably select (or influence the selection of) 
the restructuring venue123 and expect to do so.  
In truth, then, the concern about the COMI court/law defeating creditor 
expectations distils down to a concern about appropriate counter-majoritarian minority 
protections for potential holdouts that dislike the majority’s chosen mechanism for 
breaking any deadlock and the terms of the proposed deal. Minority protection, of course, 
is important. However, if expectations – as we would contend – are shaped organically by 
practice in debt markets, it is difficult to understand why the contractual expectations of 
the minority, represented by venue and governing law clauses in the finance documents, 																																																								
122 From there the objection usually takes an economic turn, ie that the overriding of creditor expectations will affect 
the cost of credit ex ante which is even more crucial as it does not only affect those firms that have entered into 
insolvency proceedings but also firms and parties contracting with them that might potentially become insolvent; see 
O Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (OUP 1995) ch 7. However, while assertions about negative effects on 
cost of credit are commonplace, we rarely see them backed up by reliable empirical evidence. 
123 A Walters, ‘United States’ Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Foreign Entities: Exorbitant or Congruent?’ (2017) 17 JCLS 
367, text to n 38. Furthermore, creditors use other contractual devices such as COMI representations and covenants to 
try to predetermine the venue for insolvency and restructuring proceedings. See eg Re Videology Limited [2018] EWHC 
2186 (Ch), [2019] BCC 195 [64]-[69]. 
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should be automatically dispositive if the majority wishes to modify the contract in a 
restructuring regime of its choice when distress arises.124 Further, skinny restructurings that 
require formal mechanisms to break deadlocks or bind in unknown creditors do have 
externalities that affect not only the finance creditors. A successful restructuring will nip a 
crisis in the bud and help to ensure that established relationships between the debtor and 
its operating creditors continue to flourish.  
Second, cross-border insolvency law’s dominant norm, modified universalism, can 
provide scaffolding for ensuring creditors are treated fairly in foreign jurisdictions, 
including through the safeguards it provides such as the public policy standard or the notion 
of ‘adequate protection’.125 We take this discussion up further in Section 5, but for now we 
note as well that modified universalism is a flexible norm that can be developed to 
accommodate the peculiarities of pre-insolvency proceedings and thus address concerns 
about over-inclusivity, within the ambit of cross-border insolvency law. 
Third, attempts to sever restructuring law (which responds to likelihood of 
insolvency) and insolvency law (which responds to factual insolvency) might do more 
harm than good.  If we conceive of problems of financial distress as being on a curve – the 
demise curve – or, without much variation, on a downward spiral, and we accept the 
proposition that early intervention higher up the curve may often be more desirable than 
later intervention lower down the curve, insolvency and restructuring law are on a 
continuum. We know that it is notoriously difficult to prove that a debtor is ‘insolvent’ or 
‘likely insolvent’ or ‘viable’ at any given moment in time because distress is fluid rather 
than static. Thus, laws deploy various techniques and proxies for judicial determination 
that streamline access into formal proceedings – in English law, tools such as the statutory 
demand126 or formal declarations in notice of appointments.127 The ‘viable business in need 
of restructuring’ may without intervention deteriorate into the ‘non-viable’ business that 
ought to be liquidated. Decisions to restructure rather than liquidate (or vice-versa) in 
response to financial distress are governance decisions that confront debtors, creditors, and 
sometimes courts, on this continuum. The questions that these decisions raise are 
interwoven: restructuring involves a distribution (or redistribution) of value among 
stakeholders just as much as liquidation, albeit the methodology (court-based valuation of 
the debtor’s future revenue streams versus market sale) is different.128 And, sometimes, 
because of hybridity, the ‘restructure or liquidate’ question is conflated within a single 
proceeding or through a combination of formal proceedings – for example, in English law, 
a scheme or company voluntary arrangement exit (restructuring) from administration (a 
proceeding used more often than not to pursue a ‘better than liquidation’ asset sale). 
‘Restructure or liquidate’ is a governance question that is also directed at how best to 
maximize value for creditors at the point of intervention. Insolvency proceedings address 																																																								
124 Especially where majority expectations may also be shaped by contractual provisions such as COMI representations 
and covenants that steer towards a COMI that is different from the governing law of the contract and minority 
expectations can be accommodated, for example, by Model Law concepts such as adequate protection. 
125 EIR, arts 33, 38; Model Law, arts 6, 21(2), 22(1).  
126 Insolvency Act 1986 s 123(1)(a) (deemed inability to pay debts as portal to compulsory winding-up);   
127  ibid Sch B1, paras 18 and 29 (statutory declaration by appointer and accompanying statement by insolvency 
practitioner in notice of appointment of administrator). 
128 Tollenaar, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal’ (n 6) 71 (‘[T]here is no principle difference between a restructuring 
and liquidation. In liquidation the business is sold to a third party for cash. In a restructuring the business is in effect 
sold to the creditors themselves. Where in a liquidation distributions are made in cash, in a restructuring distributions 
are made in the form of financial…instruments, which taken together represent the entire value of the business’). 
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collective action problems that would harm creditors collectively from maximizing value 
lower down the demise curve. Pre-insolvency (restructuring) proceedings, too, address 
holdout and free rider problems129 that harm a value-maximizing restructuring higher up 
the demise curve which may have positive spillover effects (preservation of employment, 
preservation of long-term supply chain relationships with operating creditors). 130 
Similarly, concerns that managers (or substantial creditors) will take wrong decisions – 
abusively attempting a restructuring of a non-viable debtor that ought to be liquidated or 
liquidating a viable debtor that ought to be restructured – are all part of the same 
continuum.131 Insolvency and restructuring law is, therefore, a unified body of law that 
maps onto the continuum, rather than two discrete bodies of law. One thing bleeds into the 
other. A debtor that has a likelihood of insolvency risks breaching loan covenants or 
triggering events of default and moving swiftly from ‘pre-insolvency’ to full-blown crisis. 
Rigid framings that distinguish pre-insolvency (restructuring) proceedings from insolvency 
proceedings lose sight of this fluidity. 
Fourth, given that conditions of distress are fluid and are on a continuum, 
restructuring cases can arise where debtors will need cross-border assistance and 
cooperation under existing cross-border insolvency instruments − or new instruments that 
may be adopted in the future132 − to reach a successful outcome. Take, for example, the 
case of a freestanding UK scheme of arrangement (that is a scheme not combined with 
some other proceeding) by a debtor on the cusp of a covenant breach that would be a tipping 
point between ‘likely insolvency’ and ‘insolvency’. What if a dissenting activist hedge 
fund creditor seeks to leverage its position by threatening or initiating involuntary 
insolvency or collection proceedings in another country where the debtor has assets?133 In 
that case, cross-border insolvency instruments such as the Model Law offer the prospect of 
a stay in that country that would prevent the creditor from blowing up the restructuring.134 
Cross-border insolvency instruments also provide mechanisms for exporting the effects of 
restructuring plans so that they will bind dissenting and unknown creditors wherever they 
are situated – again to prevent holdouts from disrupting the outcome. At the moment, there 
is considerable uncertainty surrounding the treatment of restructuring plans under ordinary 
commercial conflicts of law rules.135 And while the decision of the UK Supreme Court in 																																																								
129 Text to nn 30-34.   
130 See Paterson ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4) 699-700, 702, 711, 713, 715, 721 (discussing the role 
the law might play in steering creditor choice away from a sale and distribution and towards a restructuring that, if 
successful, could prevent creditors lower down the priority-in-insolvency pecking order, eg trade creditors, from 
suffering losses). 
131 Relatedly, in many systems the focus of directors’ duties in situations of pre-insolvency distress shifts from owners 
to creditors because decisions taken by managers in what is often termed the “zone of insolvency” may have profound 
implications for creditor entitlements. See eg I Mevorach, ‘The Role of Enterprise Principles in Shaping Management 
Duties at Times of Crisis’ (2013) 14 EBOR 471. 
132 See n 70. 
133 A case that provides insight into such commonplace tactics is Re Colt Telecom Group Plc [2002] EWHC 2503 (Ch), 
[2003] 1 BCLC 290. Holdout behaviour in the sovereign debt context is also instructive. See eg TM Araya, ‘A Decade of 
Sovereign Debt Litigation: Lessons from the NML v Argentina Case and the Road Ahead’ (2016) 17 Bus L Int’l 83. 
134 See eg Model Law arts 20(1)(a), (b), 21(1)(a), (b). 
135 Commercial conflicts regimes such as the recast Brussels Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (recast)) and the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Courts Agreements 
exclude ‘judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings’ (in the case of the Brussels Regulation) and 
‘insolvency, composition and analogous matters’ (in the case of the Hague Convention). On one view, based on a 
dovetailing theory, restructuring schemes involving solvent companies fall within these instruments while restructuring 
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Rubin v Eurofinance SA136 reminds us that cross-border insolvency has a long way to go 
before all local courts will enforce foreign restructuring plans on a universalist theory,137 
UNCITRAL has already taken steps to create a regime for recognition and enforcement of 
‘insolvency-related judgments’ designed to plug the gap.138 As things stand, then, cross-
border insolvency law is better placed to serve cross-border restructuring efforts.139 For 
practical purposes, it has a first mover advantage. 
Let us concede some ground for the moment and admit the possibility of a 
taxonomy that applies commercial conflicts rules to solvent restructuring proceedings and 
cross-border insolvency law rules to insolvency proceedings.140 This would accommodate 
normative positions that would object to the use of an ‘insolvency’ characterization where 
a debtor is not yet factually insolvent because individual enforcement rights are not yet 
triggered (debts have neither matured nor accelerated under the terms of the debt contract) 
and there is, as yet, no general default.141 But to overcome current uncertainties, we would 
need to design a robust international architecture of commercial conflict rules with tailored 
jurisdictional rules, mechanisms for cross-border injunctive or anti-suit relief to prevent 
holdouts from blowing up restructurings in foreign jurisdictions,142 and tailored rules on 
the recognition and enforcement of restructuring plans that deal with their special 																																																								
schemes involving insolvent companies fall within cross-border insolvency law. On another view, restructuring schemes 
outside the scope of eg the EIR are also excluded by the Brussels / Hague language, fall within a lacuna, and are subject 
to the vagaries of applicable domestic private international law. The uncertainty, even prior to Brexit, surrounding the 
legal basis for international jurisdiction and enforcement of UK schemes of arrangement is a case in point. See further 
Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes’ (n 49); Block-Lieb, ‘Reaching to Restructure’ (n 108). 
136 Rubin (n 2). 
137 See, in particular, the negative treatment of Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors 
of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508), in which the UK Privy Council enforced an order confirming 
a chapter 11 reorganization plan on the basis of the need for international cooperation in insolvency, in Rubin (n 2) and 
Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] AC 1675. The persistence of the Gibbs rule 
deriving from Antony Gibbs & Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) LR 25 QBD 399 in English 
private international law to the effect that the law governing the contract rather than the lex concursus determines the 
proper discharge of a debt further reinforces the point. See Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] UKPC 37, [2004] 1 
AC 147; In re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan, Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia et al [2018] EWHC 792 (Ch), 
[2018] Bus LR 1270, affd [2018] EWCA Civ 2802, [2019] 2 All ER 713. In In re Agrokor d.d. et al 591 BR 163 (Bkrtcy SDNY 
2018), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recognized and enforced a settlement 
agreement noting (at 192) that the Gibbs rule ‘remains the governing law in England despite its seeming incongruence 
with the principle of modified universalism espoused by the Model Law and a broad consensus of international 
insolvency practitioners and jurists.’ See also, along similar lines, K Ramesh, ‘The Gibbs Principle: A Tether on the Feet 
of Good Forum Shopping’ (2017) 29 SAcLJ 42. Divergence over the private international law rules applicable to debt 
discharge reflects ongoing confusion concerning the application of cross-border insolvency law in the restructuring 
context as well as contestation around what modified universalism entails. Insofar as Gibbs represents a territorialistic, 
decentralized approach to cross-border resolution as default, we regard it as unhelpful. We take this point up further 
in Section 5’s account of how modified universalism can work the other way around, ie as a global centralizing norm 
flexible enough to accommodate specific concerns. 
138 See n 70.   
139 A fortiori from a UK perspective given the additional uncertainties arising from Brexit and the UK’s continuing 
participation in the EIR, the Brussels Regulation or equivalent, multilateral regimes based on mutual recognition. 
140 On one view, this is how EU law is supposed to work (see n 135). 
141 See text to nn 14-15, 27-28. See also Tollenaar, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal’ (n 6) 74. Tollenaar objects to 
the Directive insofar as it contemplates the use of insolvency law techniques (eg a general stay) and rules (eg absolute 
priority) before collective enforcement rights of creditors have arisen. 
142 It is tolerably clear that provisional and protective measures of the sort contemplated by art 35 of the Brussels 
Regulation in ordinary inter partes commercial litigation would not include a comprehensive moratorium on creditor 
enforcement. 
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characteristics. 143  We would also still need a test to manage the borderline between 
‘solvency’ and ‘insolvency’ that would be hard to craft in a way that accommodates the 
fluidity of financial distress (eg ‘likely insolvent’ debtors at risk of covenant breach).  
Fifth, if we posit discrete private international law regimes for statutory contract 
modification mechanisms and insolvency proceedings with different rules of jurisdiction 
and recognition, we run into problems of hybridity that, in turn, risk unhelpful 
fragmentation of jurisdiction in cross-border restructuring. To illustrate, let us consider 
three types of hybridity. One arises from multi-purpose proceedings, like chapter 11, in 
which several outcomes – skinny restructuring, wholesale restructuring, or liquidating sale 
– can be accomplished in the same proceeding. We introduced this type – call it ‘outcome’ 
hybridity – already in Section 2. A second arises where more than one domestic law 
proceeding is combined to achieve a resolution – call it ‘combination’ hybridity – for 
example, in English law, where a scheme or company voluntary arrangement (CVA) may 
be sheltered within an administration. A third arises where a proceeding can be accessed 
by solvent or insolvent entities for restructuring. Here, the proceeding may have a single 
restructuring purpose, but it is accessible to debtors across a range of financial states. UK 
schemes of arrangement are the obvious example. Call this third type ‘financial status’ 
hybridity.  
Outcome and financial status hybrids pose a ‘generic versus functional’ 
characterization problem. Recall that under the full collectivity theory, 144  chapter 11 
proceedings are ruled ‘in’ because of the automatic stay and the capacity for a chapter 11 
debtor to force modifications on all creditors, while skinny restructurings through a scheme 
or procedure de financiére sauvegarde accélérée are ‘out’. And yet, a prepackaged chapter 
11 plan that impairs only the finance creditors is functionally the same as a skinny 
restructuring through a scheme.145  If we characterize chapter 11s generically on the basis 
that chapter 11 is capable of functioning as a fully collective proceeding, then prepackaged 
11s are ‘in’. If we characterize chapter 11s functionally on the basis of the actual outcome 
pursued, then prepackaged 11s should be ‘out’.146 A functional approach is needed to make 
a model based on full collectivity work properly, but a functional approach introduces fact 
sensitivity into what is supposed to be a streamlined process. Faced with an application for 
recognition, courts would have to sort between skinny restructuring 11s and wholesale 11s. 
A generic approach along the lines of the EIR annexes is preferable because it allows for 
easy sorting (11s are generically ‘in’ whatever their outcome) and creates strong lines of 
precedent (ie once courts recognize proceeding X under the law of country Y as an 
insolvency proceeding, there is a reasonable assurance that they will treat that proceeding 
																																																								
143  Restructuring plans are more complex than bilateral contract modifications because there are multiple 
counterparties and inter-creditor implications. It is common also for restructuring plans to contain non-debtor releases 
– ie agreements by creditors to release their claims against third party guarantors. See eg Avanti Communications (n 
92) 606-7, 615 et seq. 
144 See Section 4.2. 
145 See Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ (n 21) 69 (early financial restructuring of a portion of creditors’ 
claims not collective according to the ‘full’ collectivity theory). 
146 It is difficult to understand why the presence of the stay should make any difference to the characterization because 
in a prepackaged chapter 11, the debtor will often continue to pay operating debts as they fall due, ie there is as yet no 
common pool problem. 
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as eligible for recognition without having to engage in a fact sensitive inquiry).147 An 
outcome hybrid, like a chapter 11, raises the same issue in a different way for a model 
based on the separate domains theory that uncouples debt restructuring from insolvency 
law:148 pursuit of a worldwide sale outcome (‘in’); pursuit of a restructuring outcome –
skinny or otherwise – (‘out’). Financial status hybrids pose less of a problem for this model 
as it would exclude all restructurings whether solvent or insolvent. But the full collectivity 
model distinguishes between proceedings that address a common pool problem and those 
that do not. By that measure, a financial restructuring via a scheme of all the debts in an 
insolvent company149 that only has financial assets and debts should be ‘in’.150 
‘Combination’ hybrids pose a different sort of problem: a problem of 
fragmentation. Consider first the example of a restructuring plan sheltered behind a stay – 
exactly the kind of procedure that the Directive contemplates.151 A comprehensive stay that 
extends to secured creditors is indicative of an insolvency proceeding but a skinny 
restructuring would be treated as not fully collective according to the full collectivity model 
and as restructuring rather than insolvency according to the separate domains model. A 
seamless resolution making use of a combination of procedures would be broken into its 
constituent parts for purposes of private international law. Worldwide recognition of the 
stay proceeding would turn on cross-border insolvency law rules. Worldwide recognition 
of the restructuring proceeding would turn on ordinary commercial conflicts’ rules. 
Another example of the problem posed by combination hybrids is where a debtor 
combines a stay-cum-sale proceeding with a restructuring proceeding to achieve a 
disguised restructuring. 152  The controversial case of Bluebrook 153  is illustrative. In 
Bluebrook a group of debtors proposed schemes of arrangement with its senior lenders that 
involved a pre-packaged sale of its operating business to a Newco entity sheltered within 
an administration proceeding. Under this scheme-cum-administration, senior creditors 
were to receive part of the sale proceeds and were offered equity in the new entity in return 
for releasing the balance of their claims. Junior creditors offered nothing in the scheme 
were left with worthless claims against Oldco, an outcome justified on the basis that the 
junior creditors had no economic interest in the group because the value of the group’s 																																																								
147 Our contention here is that speed in cross-border insolvency and restructuring is a practical necessity and we would 
therefore trade off the risk of ‘false positives’ against the risk of uncertainty as to which private international law rules 
apply in a given case. 
148 See Section 4.3. 
149 Or in a company where general default is triggered under the finance documents by the company taking steps to 
restructure. 
150 The EIR attempts to solve the problem of financial status hybrids by excluding them as a genus: see text to n 108. 
However, there is uncertainty concerning whether schemes of arrangement involving either solvent or insolvent 
companies are also excluded from the Brussels Regulation. If, on one plausible view, only solvent restructurings fall 
within the Brussels Regulation, the same proceeding would be treated differently under current law depending on 
whether it involved a solvent or insolvent company. This underscores our point in the text to nn 139-43 to the effect 
that it would be unwise to exclude restructuring proceedings from cross-border insolvency law without first devising a 
specialist international commercial conflicts regime to accommodate them. 
151 The UK government’s proposed 28-day moratorium for companies that are prospectively insolvent combined with 
a scheme, CVA, or the proposed new restructuring procedure would also fall into this category. See Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (n 44) 42-58, 63-74. 
152 Paterson ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory’ (n 4) 709 (discussing how a pre-packaged sale of operating 
subsidiaries to a new entity in an administration can be twinned with a scheme of arrangement to achieve a debt-equity 
swap that leaves dissenting or ‘out of the money’ classes with worthless claims against an insolvent parent company 
the value of which has been extracted by the sale). 
153 Re Bluebrook Ltd [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch), [2000] BCC 209. 
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assets was less than the value of the senior debt. The restructuring was skinny not wholesale 
– only finance creditors were affected – and the end result was functionally identical to a 
whole class cramdown.154 By combining the administration stay with a scheme exit, the 
debtor achieved a result under English law that could have been achieved more 
straightforwardly in chapter 11. Perhaps, then, a full collectivity model would treat the 
composite as an insolvency proceeding. However, the point is not free from doubt because 
it may regard skinny restructurings (the scheme portion in Bluebrook) as ‘not fully 
collective’.155 The separate domains model would treat the administration as an insolvency 
proceeding and the scheme as a restructuring proceeding. Thus, were it to be necessary for 
the debtor (i) to prevent disruption of the sale by seeking foreign recognition of the 
administration and a worldwide stay and (ii) to seek foreign recognition of the effect of the 
scheme, different rules would apply to (i) and (ii). 
Fragmentation has jurisdictional implications. The application of different rules to 
different pieces of a combination hybrid could mean that different courts (the insolvency-
home court and the court selected by contract) would have jurisdiction over those different 
pieces. Similarly, in countries that maintain an institutional separation between bankruptcy 
and commercial courts, debtors might well need to seek the assistance of a bankruptcy 
court with respect to the ‘insolvency’ piece and a commercial court with respect to the 
‘restructuring’ piece.156 This would be an unfortunate way to deal with problems of distress 
that are on a single continuum. It would make the coordination of cross-border cases more 
difficult and costlier and potentially allocate cases (or portions of cases) to generalist courts 
that lack the focused expertise of bankruptcy courts. Cross-border cases in which 
stakeholders wish to pursue a financial and operational restructuring involving both asset 
disposals and a confirmed plan would be harder to accomplish. 
For all these reasons, a single legal and institutional framework of transnational law 
that treats insolvency and restructuring law as a unified body of law (call it ‘the law of 
transnational distress’) and that covers the entire continuum may be the preferred approach. 
Although the current international framework of cross-border insolvency law undoubtedly 
has gaps,157 it is the best model we have for streamlining coordination and scrutiny in cross-
border cases. Carving some or all pre-insolvency proceedings out of this framework might 
increase rather than reduce the uncertainty on the fluid borderline between ‘solvency’ and 
‘insolvency’, and potentially increase coordination costs because of the risk of 
fragmentation. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
154 Payne ‘The Role of the Court’ (n 49) 140. 
155 Text to nn 112-15.  
156 If, for example, skinny restructurings were carved out of the federal jurisdiction of the US bankruptcy court, the 
restructuring portion of a combination hybrid involving a scheme of New York governed law notes would end up in a 
state court because (i) there would be no federal subject matter jurisdiction and (ii) there is no general federal law 
governing recognition of foreign judgments. Federal courts can apply state conflicts law where they have diversity or 
federal question jurisdiction. But absent a basis for federal jurisdiction in chapter 15, recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign restructuring plan would be a state court matter. See generally RA Brand, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments (Federal Judicial Center 2012) <https://www.fjc.gov/content/recognition-and-enforcement-
foreign-judgments-0>. 
157 See generally Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3). 
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5. MODIFIED UNIVERSALISM & PRE-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 
 
While earlier in Section 3 we described modified universalism in absolute terms, 
the truth is that modified universalism has been understood in different ways and, 
notwithstanding its dominance, the nature of modified universalism is still somewhat 
amorphous and contested.158  Modified universalism is often viewed as some form of 
compromise between universalism and territorialism,159 or as an interim solution until the 
ideal of pure universalism can be achieved.160 It has been dubbed a ‘thread’, a ‘term’, or a 
‘trend’.161 Nonetheless, it can be observed that modified universalism is evolving as a norm 
in its own right.162 It is not so much a compromise as a realistic, and thus flexible, approach, 
that can accommodate different business structures, different types of proceeding, different 
market sizes, different levels of market integration, and new or emerging trends in the field 
of insolvency.163 Modified universalism aims to achieve the goals of insolvency, on a 
cross-border level, namely to promote a fair and indeed the most efficient solution, 
considering the positions of all relevant stakeholders wherever located.164 It seeks to enable 
global solutions to multinational default with efficient levels of centralization of insolvency 
proceedings. 165  It is becoming a prevalent norm, increasingly followed by countries, 
institutions tasked with implementation of international instruments and international 
policy makers.  
Moreover, modified universalism may be emerging as customary international law 
(CIL).166 CIL is a recognized legal source that can fill gaps in international instruments and 
influence existing instruments. It arises from the general and consistent practice of states, 
where that practice is based on a belief in the conformity of the practice with international 
law. Once CIL has become pervasive enough, countries are bound by it regardless of 
whether they have codified the laws domestically or through treaties. CIL is also responsive 
to emerging trends in practice. Modified universalism is already quite dominant, and it is 
also flexible and thus akin to CIL. It can finally transform into CIL to become part of the 
international insolvency legal order if we no longer aspire to implement pure universalism 
but instead focus the effort on specifying the modified universalist norm and improving its 
coverage and reach. Because of its flexibility and wide applicability (as a default system 																																																								
158 ibid 80. 
159 Cf the ‘Internationalist Principle’ which was similarly developed as a form of ‘workable compromise’ between the 
‘rival principles’ of international insolvency. See IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (n 2) 11, 15. 
160 See eg Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency Law (Intersentia 2017) 28 (‘For the time being, exceptions to the 
principle of universalism . . . must be tolerated, yet there is no need to lose sight of the final goals of global 
implementation of this principle with as few exceptions as possible’). Cf. eg, JAE Pottow, ‘Beyond Carve-Outs and 
Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework for Cross- Border Insolvency Choice of Law’ (2014) 9(1) Brook J Corp Fin & 
Com 197, 198 (suggesting that modified universalism is at present an independent normative approach, though 
considered an incremental step towards pure universalism). 
161 See eg In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852 [7], [30] where the UK court 
refers to a ‘principle rather than a rule’, an ‘aspiration’ and a ‘thread’; In re Nortel Networks, Inc, 532 BR 494 (Bankr D 
Del 2015) 111 where the US court refers to ‘terms such as ‘universalism’; Rubin (n 2) [16] where the UK Supreme Court 
notes that ‘there has been a trend, but only a trend, to what is called universalism . . .’. 
162 See Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) ch 3. 
163 For a mapping of the different aspects of the modified universalist norm, see ibid 14 et seq. 
164 Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) 15 et seq. 
165 Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution’ (n 3). 
166  This paragraph draws on Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) ch 3; I Mevorach, ‘Modified 
Universalism as Customary International Law’ (2018) 96 Texas Law Review 101. 
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that does not require active adoption), CIL, alongside the further development of 
instruments such as the Model Law, can also to some extent overcome territorialist biases 
that still prevail in real-world decision making.167 
Modified universalism is more advanced in some aspects than it is in others. For 
example, the norms concerning enterprise groups or regarding banks (in cross-border 
insolvency/resolution) are at an emergent stage.168 Indeed, so is the modified universalist 
norm as it applies to pre-insolvency proceedings. Modified universalism is, however, 
pliable and can react to new trends in the market, and the evolution of preventive 
procedures is one such notable movement. The modified universalist norm is also 
influenced by developments of international instruments, in the form of soft or hard law 
(and vice versa, the norm influences the instruments).169  
As explained in Section 3, both the EIR and the Model Law (the key 
regional/international instruments of cross-border insolvency) have, to some extent, 
already adapted to the trend towards pre-insolvency proceedings, which in turn contributes 
to the development of modified universalism. This response to the pre-insolvency trend in 
the instruments is, however, not necessarily complete. There is room for further 
consideration of the type of cross-border solutions that should be employed in such cases. 
Issues for further consideration flow from the discussion of core features of pre-insolvency 
proceedings discussed earlier. We briefly indicate below some aspects of cross-border pre-
insolvency proceedings that may require flexible accommodation by the modified 
universalism norm and the instruments linked to it, though we do not suggest that this 
exposition represents a complete list.  
In terms of jurisdiction and the mirroring recognition rule, it was noted in Section 
3 that modified universalism has largely focused on the notion of the debtor ‘home 
country’, which has been developed into the COMI rule in the regional and international 
instruments. In the typical formal insolvency cases, which involve operational 
reorganization or liquidation, centralization of a cross-border insolvency process will most 
efficiently take place at the COMI. ‘Forum shopping’ to other places should be closely 
scrutinized to ensure that relocations are not pursued for the wrong reasons,170 and that 
creditors are on board and the relocation does not contradict their expectations.171 In cross-
border pre-insolvency proceedings, however, and especially in skinny restructurings, the 
jurisdiction/recognition rule may be more relaxed at least in the way it is applied in practice. 
It may be less important to concentrate the proceedings in the place of key operational 
decisions, and more important to look for a jurisdiction that can effectively affect a 
restructuring, namely a forum that provides a proceeding exhibiting the core features of 
pre-insolvency measures discussed earlier. The home of the restructuring, therefore, may 
																																																								
167 Such biases include loss aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, bounded willpower of policy makers, and 
territorialist short-termism (see Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) ch 2). 
168 Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) 20. See also the forthcoming UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Enterprise Groups, which is likely to be finalised and adopted in summer 2019 (n 70). 
169 ibid 112-13 (explaining the interaction between modified universalism as an emerging customary international law 
and the development of cross-border insolvency instruments). 
170 Abusive forum shopping involves self-serving relocations where the debtor or influential creditors attempt to move 
to a jurisdiction favourable to them at the expense of the general body of creditors (ibid 198). 
171 In accordance with the understanding of COMI as the place of central administration ascertainable by third parties: 
see EIR, art 3(1); Guide to Enactment 70-71. 
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not necessarily be at the COMI,172 strictly speaking in the sense of where operational 
decisions were ascertainably made before the need for pre-insolvency proceedings arose.  
As explained in Section 2, a key aim of pre-insolvency proceedings is to resolve 
deadlocks and hold-outs. On the international level, this aim can be extended to resolving 
‘jurisdiction deadlocks’ and ‘jurisdiction holdouts’, where the debtor or relevant creditors 
attempt to initiate a pre-insolvency proceeding in a place where such a proceeding is 
available and is likely to provide an effective outcome. Concerns regarding creditors’ 
expectations are also generally less acute. 173  Subject to safeguards, ordinarily such 
attempts should be permitted. The presumption should be in favour of the relocation, which 
may be understood as ‘forum choice’ (ex post when the debtor is approaching insolvency) 
in such cases. Furthermore, a full relocation of the COMI may not be required for 
ascertaining jurisdiction (under the EIR system) and for recognition of the pre-insolvency 
proceeding as the main proceeding (under the Model Law regime), especially where in the 
(original) COMI forum a restructuring mechanism is not available.174  
The reality is that many countries have not yet caught up with global restructuring 
trends. The case of Ocean Rig provides a good example.175  In this case, a group of 
companies were COMI’d in a country that had no pre-insolvency proceeding (Marshall 
Islands). The group’s members therefore relocated their COMI and initiated debt 
restructuring proceedings in the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands court appointed joint 
provisional liquidators to promote schemes of arrangement for the companies. The 
provisional liquidators then sought recognition of the proceedings in the United States 
under the Model Law (chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code). Notwithstanding 
objections, the Bankruptcy Court granted interim relief enabling the provisional liquidators 
to set up and procure creditor acceptance and court approval of Cayman schemes and 
subsequently recognized the Cayman proceedings based, in part, on a finding that the 
debtors’ relocation was legitimate in circumstances where the Cayman Islands, unlike the 
Marshall Islands has a well-established system for debt restructuring.176 The Bankruptcy 
Court then went on to enforce the Cayman schemes of arrangement by means of a 
permanent injunction177 – currently the standard approach in the US for giving effect to 
foreign restructurings.178 																																																								
172 See also the new forthcoming model law for enterprise groups (n 70), which will allow the concentration of 
proceedings in a planning forum for the purpose of developing and implementing a group insolvency solution at the 
main (COMI) forum of an enterprise group member which ‘is likely to be a necessary and integral participant in that 
group insolvency solution’. 
173 See Section 4. 
174 See JL Westbrook, ‘Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market’ (n 79) 1483-88 (articulating circumstances in 
which it may be plausible to select a central ‘control’ court other than the COMI court as the locus of the main 
proceeding including eg where a case cannot be filed in the COMI court or where a filing elsewhere would better serve 
the interests of stakeholders because of deficiencies in the COMI jurisdiction’s insolvency system). See also Mevorach, 
The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) 186. 
175 In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc 570 BR 687 (Bkrtcy SDNY 2017). 
176 ibid 703, 706-7. 
177 ibid 707. Footnote 7 of Judge Glenn’s opinion contemplates this course of action and an order for permanent 
injunctive relief was entered after a separate hearing. See further In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc, Case No 17-10736-mg, 
Order Granting Joint Provisional Liquidators’ Motion Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 1507, 1509(b)(2)-(3), 1517(d), 1521(a) 
and 1525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for an Order Giving Full Force and Effect to Cayman Schemes of Arrangement, 20 
September 2017. 
178 Avanti Communications (n 92) 615 et seq; Energy Coal SPA (n 112). Cf In re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan (n 
137). 
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The EIR rule on jurisdiction is already quite flexible because it does not prohibit 
debtors from moving their COMIs when insolvency is approaching. The EIR places modest 
limits on forum shopping providing only that if the registered office of the company was 
moved within three months before the request for opening of insolvency proceedings, the 
presumption that the COMI is at the registered office will not apply.179 The Model Law 
does not prohibit forum shopping either. The Guide to Enactment is clear that the debtor’s 
COMI may move prior to the commencement of proceedings ‘in some instances in close 
proximity to commencement...’180 However, in such circumstances, the Guide states that it 
is desirable that the receiving court considers more carefully the factors relevant to 
determining COMI and takes ‘account of the debtor’s circumstances more broadly.’181 In 
this respect, the Guide notes in particular that ‘the test that the centre of main interests is 
readily ascertainable by third parties may be harder to meet if the move of the centre of 
main interests occurs in close proximity to the opening of proceedings.’182 We argue that a 
shift or a choice of forum to pursue a restructuring, where it is done for the benefit of the 
creditors as a whole because the new forum provides appropriate tools not available in the 
original jurisdiction, should be accepted and recognized following careful assessment of 
the circumstances and reasons for the move consistent with the Guide to Enactment.  
A flexible application of rules on jurisdiction/recognition can also be conducive to 
group cross-border restructurings. New provisions in the EIR 183  and the forthcoming 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Groups184 allow some flexibility regarding plans 
for enterprise groups in distress. Such plans may be developed in a ‘coordination 
proceedings’ (under the EIR) which may be ‘requested before any court	having jurisdiction 
over the insolvency proceedings of a member of the group’, 185  or (pursuant to the 
UNCITRAL instrument) in a ‘planning proceedings’ which is a main proceedings 
commenced in respect of a group member and in which other members participate.186 
Under the forthcoming UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Groups, it will also be 
possible to avoid opening additional main proceedings in the forums where group members 
had their COMIs.187 These new concepts should be applied, we argue, sufficiently broadly, 
especially in the context of restructurings.  
The pre-insolvency forum should also govern the proceeding based primarily on its 
laws and procedures, and this should be recognized internationally, even in the face of 
objections.188 Yet, this primary rule of deference to the law of the main forum may not be 
absolute and the regime may design specific ‘carve outs’.189 Even when a restructuring is 
usefully centralized, it should be possible to open additional processes pursuant to domestic 
law where it is efficient or otherwise appropriate to do so – such an approach will comply 																																																								
179 EIR, article 3(1). 
180 Guide to Enactment, para 148. 
181 ibid. 
182 ibid. 
183 EIR, Chapter V. 
184 See n 70. 
185 EIR, art 61(1). 
186 Draft Model Law on Enterprise Groups, n 70, art 2. 
187 Ibid, arts 31-32 (though these provisions are considered more ambitious and hence provided as ‘supplemental’ in 
the Draft Model Law on Enterprise Groups). 
188 See also R Mokal, ‘Shopping and Scheming, and the Rule in Gibbs’ South Square Digest, March 2017, 58-63 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922237 >.  
189 See Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency (n 3) 21 et seq. 
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with the tenets of modified universalism. Additionally, if the restructuring is not in the 
original COMI forum (because there was a COMI migration), local laws other than the law 
of the main forum should be taken into account.190 International insolvency objectives may 
also justify giving effect to local protections because of recognized public policies or the 
need to protect certain parties, including when they actually relied on the local law and can 
demonstrate that the application of the home country law would contradict their legitimate 
expectations.191 But a centralized process, even when taking place in parallel to additional 
local processes or accommodating certain local rights, may rely on the procedures and tools 
available in the main restructuring forum and a full importation of the procedures of local 
regimes may not be necessary.192 
Indeed, the choice of law (or ‘applicable law’) norm is generally in a more 
developing stage compared to the jurisdiction norm of modified universalism. The Model 
Law does not explicitly address the choice of law problem, nor do the newer instruments 
developed by UNCITRAL on the enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and the 
insolvency of enterprise groups.193 This gap should be addressed to make the cross-border 
insolvency framework more complete, and in the course of such deliberations, the 
implications on pre-insolvency proceedings should be considered. The EIR, on the other 
hand, already contemplates detailed rules on applicable law, but in future revisions of these 
rules (alongside the other key provisions on jurisdiction and recognition), more attention 
can be given to how the rules apply to pre-insolvency proceedings. 
The norm regarding relief that should be provided by foreign courts to main 
proceedings, and its application in instruments, may also require accommodation. Under 
the Model Law, for example, the key relief granted to foreign main proceedings is a stay 
of individual actions and execution against the debtors’ assets.194 This relief is automatic 
and denying it is allowed only on the basis of the public policy exception.195 We noted in 
Section 2, however, that while an automatic stay is a core component of a chapter 11 case, 
it is an optional measure in other pre-insolvency proceedings, including those contemplated 
by the Directive. Relief in cross-border insolvency, in particular under the Model Law, 
which largely relies on relief requests by foreign representatives, may develop to address 
more accurately the needs of pre-insolvency proceedings with international elements. In a 
restructuring context, recognition of foreign main proceedings may be sought, for example, 
to extend their binding effects to stakeholders in other jurisdictions. On the other hand, a 
procedural stay of proceedings and executions, which is currently granted automatically 
under the Model Law when proceedings are recognized as foreign main proceedings, may 
not always be required as some restructurings may be negotiated successfully without a 
need formally to stop creditors’ enforcement.  
Safeguards in instruments, primarily the public policy exception to recognition and 
relief (available in both the EIR and the UNCITRAL instruments), or the notion of 
‘adequate protection’ mentioned earlier in Section 4, may require additional 																																																								
190 ibid 22-23 (noting the ‘synthetic secondary proceedings’ solution developed in the EU regime and the mechanisms 
for avoiding multiple main and non-main proceedings in the forthcoming model law on enterprise groups through the 
giving of undertakings concerning the application of local laws).  
191 ibid 23 (referring to JAE Pottow, ‘Beyond Carve-Outs’ (n 160) 205 et seq). 
192 ibid. 
193 ibid 22.  
194 Model Law, art 20. 
195 Model Law, art 6. 
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specification, 196  so that they can be applied appropriately in a restructuring context. 
Importantly, modified universalism and instruments that subscribe to the norm may 
develop to clarify applicable international standards of fairness in restructuring, which if 
not followed might result in denial of recognition and of cross-border effects. Notions of 
fairness in restructuring are still developing alongside the evolution of various preventive 
procedures.197 Instruments such as the Directive and related comparative studies begin to 
contemplate what fairness may require at the various steps in a restructuring process,198 
and thus contribute to the emergence of clearer international standards in this area. Indeed, 
within integrated regions, such as the EU, greater harmonization of pre-insolvency 
proceedings (which may result from the Directive’s implementation) is conducive to the 
effective application of the EU cross-border insolvency system, based on mutual trust and 
automatic recognition. Internationally, with lesser harmonization and a more complicated 
and fluctuating system of trust, the notion of public policy (or adequate protection) may 
have a more important role, even though the aspiration is to limit its use.  
The norm of modified universalism and the instruments governing cross-border 
insolvency may continue to evolve in the future to accommodate the peculiarities of pre-
insolvency proceedings, as experience of handling such processes accumulates. Additional 
issues to consider in this respect may include, for example, the precise role of the court as 
guardian of procedural or substantive rights of creditors in various types of pre-insolvency 
proceedings, in a cross-border context. What we wish to emphasize at this stage is that this 
flexibility of the modified universalist norm allows it to address the concerns regarding 
over-inclusivity and alleged lack of nuance of cross-border insolvency law. We can refine 
and develop the way the norm and the cross-border insolvency instruments apply in 
different restructuring processes without depriving pre-insolvency proceedings of the 
benefits of cross-border insolvency law as a sui generis system of private international law. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The popularity of pre-insolvency proceedings of the types that are nowadays on the 
rise internationally may continue, or other ways to address companies’ financial distress 
may emerge in the future. Yet, so long as proceedings sit on the spectrum between the pure 
contractual and the fully formal and possess certain core characteristics of ‘state-supplied’ 
processes aimed at avoiding insolvency, there is merit in including them within a unified 
law of transnational distress for private international law purposes. Building on the existing 
foundations of international insolvency law is also prudent for we do not yet know what 
the next wave of restructurings in Europe will look like.  
Along the spectrum, proceedings may not be classified neatly within pre-defined 
boxes and may represent hybrids that can function both as classic pre-insolvency 
restructuring proceedings and as formal rehabilitation processes. In the so-called twilight 
when debtors are approaching insolvency, insolvency laws, therefore, increasingly attempt 
to assist firms and their stakeholders by providing incentives and mechanisms for value 
maximization, at whichever point on the demise curve the intervention occurs. Cross-
border insolvency law as a special system of private international law, governed by the 																																																								
196 Eg in guides or explanatory notes accompanying the cross-border insolvency instruments. 
197 See generally on notions of fairness in restructuring, Paterson, ‘Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness’ (n 29). 
198 See Stanghellini et al, Best Practices in European Restructuring (n 5), ch II. 
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overarching norm of modified universalism, can make these mechanisms work better 
globally, by minimising coordination and other process costs through a centralized 
resolution that properly takes into account the interests of all stakeholders involved.  
The leading cross-border insolvency instruments, the Model Law and the EIR, 
which generally follow modified universalism, have responded to the global restructuring 
trend by favouring the inclusion of debt restructuring proceedings within their scope. 
Concerns about over-inclusivity of these instruments are, however, important. But as the 
debate continues, the benefits that cross-border insolvency can provide to pre-insolvency 
proceedings should not be overlooked. Instead of excluding pre-insolvency proceedings 
from cross-border insolvency law’s scope, we argue that it is preferable to consider how to 
accommodate the instruments and their underlying (modified universalist) norm so that 
they serve pre-insolvency proceedings properly. Being a flexible norm, modified 
universalism can adjust its rules to respond to changing market conditions and to new types 
of proceedings. 
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